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Abstract
The tax administration is at risk of an overcorrection with respect to
its rulemaking process. Tax practitioners increasingly are mining the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as well as chipping away at barriers to pre-enforcement review of tax rules. Tax rules include regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and more informal
guidance to the public. APA-
based challenges to tax rules have
gained traction in the courts, typically alleging inadequate explanation or timing irregularities involving notice and comment. Such
claims potentially pose major challenges for fair and efficient tax
administration.
This Article integrates administrative law scholarship calling
for a rule of reason with respect to remedies for inadequate explanation
and postpromulgation comment. There is no conflict between the pushback against tax exceptionalism and an approach involving remedial
restraint. The harmless error approach is rooted in the text of the APA,
which requires a court to set aside agency action for “prejudicial”
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error. Judicial restraint is unlikely to chill robust participation by tax
advisors and should promote the issuance of stable and reliable guidance, compliance with the tax law, and fair treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
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Introduction
The tax administration is at risk of an overcorrection with respect to its
rulemaking process. Tax rules include regulations, revenue rulings,
revenue procedures, and more informal guidance to the public. Following the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research v. United States,1 Administrative

Procedure Act-based challenges to tax rules have gained traction in
the courts.2 Meanwhile, the weight of tax scholarship criticizes “tax
exceptionalism”3—the notion that tax is deeply different from other
fields of law or requires special administrative procedures or judicial
review. Overcorrection, however, could also represent a kind of exceptionalism. This Article argues that judicial review of the tax administration’s compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act4 (APA)
should avoid reflexive vacatur of rules that experienced process defects.
Moreover, this argument does not amount to tax exceptionalism; scholarship and jurisprudence outside of tax inspire and support an approach
to judicial review involving nuance and restraint.

1. 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
2. See, e.g., CIC Servs., LLC. v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding Anti-
Injunction Act precluded pre-
enforcement review), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 926 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2019) (deferring to the regulations and holding that the agency’s
decisionmaking process was clear enough), rev’g 145 T.C. 91 (2015) (unanimously invalidating as arbitrary and capricious regulations requiring parties
to a Qualified Cost Sharing Agreement to include stock compensation costs
in the cost pool to comply with the arm’s length standard); Dominion Res.,
Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (invalidating as arbitrary
and capricious regulations requiring capitalization of costs related to self-
produced property); Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY,
2017 WL 4682050, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017) (invalidating temporary
regulations for postpromulgation comment). Sometimes substantive review
of tax rules has blended with perceived process shortcomings. See Good Fortune Shipping SA v. Comm’r, 897 F.3d 256 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (invalidating as
unreasonable a regulation that would have reversed a prior rule).
3. See infra Part III.
4. Codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
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Scholars concerned about exceptionalism rightly urge the tax
administration to comply with the APA.5 This could amount to more of
an attitude adjustment than an earthquake. This is especially true if, as
this Article suggests, the courts proceed to take a flexible approach to
review of tax rules. Over time, such an approach may help distinguish
policy preferences of tax practitioners from prejudicial errors of
the tax administration. Thus, implementing a more thoughtful, systematic compliance with the APA should not end up wrecking the tax
administration.
The tax community, to be sure, is still digesting the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Mayo Foundation.6 The Mayo Foundation
challenged a Treasury regulation clarifying whether medical residents

5. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds
and Harmless Errors: Judicial Review of Post-Promulgation Notice and
Comment, 101 Cornell L. R ev. 261, 308 (2016); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. R ev. 465 (2013); Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 Minn. L. R ev.
221, 267–68 (2014); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and
Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. R ev. 643, 698–99 (2012);
Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax
Regulators, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 773, 775 (1987). But see Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63
Duke L.J. 1673, 1682 (2014) (criticizing “top-down” approach that “fail[s] to
consider what came before the APA”); Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory
Process, 35 Va. Tax R ev. 553, 558 (2016) (“Instead of forcing all agencies to
conform to one set of principles, Congress and the courts should figure out
which principles work in different contexts to accomplish administrative
law’s underlying objectives.”); Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative
Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 Duke L.J. Online 21, 23–24 (2014) (urging
courts to apply the law in a “pragmatic spirit” and “give Treasury the benefit
of any doubt” on interpretative rules); James M. Puckett, Structural Tax
Exceptionalism, 49 Ga. L. R ev. 1067 (2015); Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 Tax L. R ev. 179, 195 (2017) (arguing that
“congressional control of tax rulemaking should satisfy administrative law’s
demand for political accountability”).
6. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55 (“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less deferential standard of review. . . . In the absence
of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach . . . good for
tax law only.”).
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qualified as students.7 Given that the Treasury Department took an
unremarkable notice and comment procedure before finalizing the
regulation, the Supreme Court deferred under Chevron.8 This clarification has not been uncontroversial among the tax bar. Practitioners also
have pivoted from the Court’s skepticism about “an approach . . . good
for tax law only”9 to bring APA-based challenges to tax regulations.10
In this period of borrowing, learning, deconstruction, and
growth, the avoidance of exceptionalism should not be talismanic. There
is a clear risk of oversimplification as tax lawyers, scholars, and jurists
wrestle with APA concepts that have relatively recently started to come
into focus.11 Undoubtedly, the implication will sometimes be that courts
subject tax rulemaking to costly procedural requirements under the APA
or perhaps disallow administrative action that is apparently permitted
by the I.R.C.12 At the same time, a wide-ranging general administrative
law literature and jurisprudence cautions against over-proceduralization
of administrative action.13
At the risk that it may resemble exceptionalism, this Article posits that the case against hyper-formal compliance with the APA will
benefit from tax-specific context. This is not to suggest that the tax

7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 58. If the Chevron framework applies to an agency interpretation, a court should first determine whether Congress has “directly
addressed the precise question at issue,” and if not, the court “may not disturb
an agency rule unless it is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Id. at 52–53 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); Household Credit Servs.,
Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).
9. 562 U.S. at 55.
10. See cases cited supra note 2. Although beyond the scope of this
Article, challenges are also being pursued under other procedural statutes,
such as the Paperwork Reduction Act and Regulatory Flexibility Act. See Silver v. IRS, No. 1:19-cv-00247, 2019 WL 7168625 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019);
Monte Silver, So You Want to Challenge a Treasury Regulation Issued Under
the TCJA?, 166 Tax Notes Fed. 1137 (Feb. 17, 2020); Andrew Velarde, Suit
Against GILTI Regs Alleges Administrative Law Violations, 98 Tax Notes
Int’l 1433 (Jun. 22, 2020).
11. Cf. Camp, supra note 5, at 1681–82 (criticizing the “top-down
approach” that pays insufficient attention to the organic statute).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra note 22; Part III.A–B.
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administration should take a system-wide free pass. Rather, it is important to anticipate the critique that anything but rigid compliance with
the APA would be unacceptable or exceptionally harmful in the tax
administration. Nothing about this context, however, gives great cause
for concern.
Given the text of the I.R.C., the history of tax collection and
administration, and the current context,14 the general argument for judicial restraint maps naturally onto tax administration. Litigation about
tax rules will be particularly imbalanced, even compared with a larger
administrative state that is easily dominated by regulated groups. Taking this into account does not render the project an example of “exceptionalism” or “tax exceptionalism.” The intent is to consider whether
there is any cause for concern about a general approach to balancing
agency effectiveness, public participation, and other values.15 Even if
there are important patterns in tax administration, courts should carefully consider the unique facts of each case. In general, courts reviewing agency action soften rules, if not openly balance, and are wary of
imposing procedures that are not explicitly required. Even so, compliance is costly.16 Whatever the potential benefits, additional funding for
tax administration seems quite unlikely to be on the horizon.17

14. See infra Part III.C.
15. Cf. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax: Different,
Not Exceptional, 71 Admin. L. R ev. 663, 705–10, 716 (2019) (critiquing the
use of “tax exceptionalism”).
16. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise
of the Unitary Executive, 70 Admin. L. R ev. 515, 548 (2018) (“rule-making is
time and resource intensive, sufficiently so that it dissuades agencies from
undertaking the effort and presidents from relying on it”); Aaron L. Nielson,
Sticky Regulations, 85 U. Chi. L. R ev. 85, 89 (2018) (“nearly everyone agrees
that the procedures that give rise to ossification make it harder for agencies to
regulate”); Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive
Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 Tex. L. R ev. 1701, 1709
(2008) (“agencies are regulating too little and too slowly”).
17. See IRS Advisory Council, Public R eport 9 (2018) (“Far from
‘consistently, adequately and appropriately’ funding the IRS to fulfill its core
service, compliance and enforcement missions, Congress has slashed the IRS
budget every year since 2011.”); William Hoffman, Tax Pros Predict Filing
Season Woes if IRS Budget Crunch Lasts, 157 Tax Notes Today 1709, 1709
(Dec. 18, 2017) (noting that IRS budget “has shrunk from $12.1 billion in fiscal 2012 to $11.2 billion in 2016” amid increased responsibilities); Joshua P.
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Professor Kristin Hickman and Mark Thomson have argued for
opening the door—but seemingly just a crack—to a harmless error analysis in judicial review of postpromulgation comment.18 Although this
may be a step in the right direction, their proposal has a limited scope.
Arbitrary and capricious review may prove more of a threat to tax rules
than the timing of public comment. Moreover, Hickman and Thomson
would put a heavy burden on agencies to show harmless error.19 The
showing they have envisioned would emphasize open-mindedness on
the part of agencies.20 This would be especially troublesome in the tax
administration. Because standing to litigate tax matters is especially
hard to demonstrate, the open mind would, even more than usual, tend
to move in favor of special interests. If this approach leads to more litigation and provides false hope, it could be worse than a strict compliance approach.
This Article, in contrast, recommends a more flexible approach,
drawing on many administrative law scholars who have questioned the
benefits of rigid adherence to the APA. Even for seemingly bright-line
rules, context matters, or should matter.21 It is appropriate to question
the benefits and costs of procedures or remedies—particularly when
not explicitly required by statute.22 In addition, judges have, at least

Law, Note, Balancing Efficient IRS Administration and Taxpayer Rights, 43
Seton Hall Legis. J. 337, 338 (2019) (noting that computer software and hardware are out of date).
18. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 306, 310–16 (suggesting that a “strong” burden should be on the agency to rebut with a “particularized defense subject to judicial scrutiny” and arguing that an agency’s
lack of “responsiveness” or swiftness in rejecting postpromulgation comments should be key factors against saving a challenged rule).
19. Id. at 312.
20. Id. at 294. But see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul
Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2385 (2020) (rejecting an inquiry into
agency open-mindedness following an interim rule).
21. Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property
Law, 46 U.C. Davis L. R ev. 1369, 1420–21, 1433 (2013) (observing that bright-
line rules “are not as different from flexible standards as we might think” due
to latent ambiguities of scope, with “no rule for determining whether a case is
easy or hard”).
22. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 Mich. L.
R ev. 345 (2019) (arguing that strict APA compliance is unnecessary to achieve
the ends desired by APA proponents) [hereinafter Bagley, Procedure Fetish];
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implicitly, struck a balance. To avoid tax exceptionalism, these themes
must be considered carefully.
Executive orders, other forms of presidential control, or internal discretion may result in additional limits on the Treasury Department and IRS.23 For example, on March 5, 2019, the Treasury Department
announced a general, nonbinding policy of endeavoring to use notice
and comment rulemaking to issue regulations, even if the APA does not
require it; of avoiding the issuance of temporary regulations without
good cause; and of forgoing claims of deference for subregulatory guidance.24 Not long afterwards, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued a
notice suggesting that it could still argue for a lesser form of deference
for subregulatory guidance.25 In addition, an October 9, 2019, executive
order requires notice and comment for the issuance of a “significant

Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 Colum. L.
R ev. 253 (2017) [hereinafter Bagley, Remedial Restraint]; Murphy, supra note
5, at 23 (suggesting a “pragmatic and conservative” attitude about the “notice-
and-comment gap”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness
Review Made Reasonable: Structural and Conceptual Reform of the “Hard
Look,” 92 Notre Dame L. R ev. 331 (2016) (urging courts to be flexible about
accepting certain post hoc justifications for rules); cf. Gillian E. Metzger,
Forward: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L.
R ev. 1, 6 (2017) (observing that “[l]ike today, the 1930s attack on ‘agency
government’ took on a strongly constitutional and legal cast” and that such
“efforts were plainly political, fueled by business and legal interests deeply
opposed to pro-labor regulation and economic planning”); Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi. L. R ev.
297, 300 (2017) (criticizing what the authors dub “the sign fallacy,” i.e., the
propensity of some commentators to “identify the likely sign of an effect and
then to declare victory, without examining its magnitude—without asking
whether it is realistic to think that the effect will be significant”).
23. See Memorandum of Agreement, U.S. Treas. Dep’t & Off. of
Mgmt. & Budget, Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866
(Apr. 11, 2018).
24. See U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory
Process (Mar. 5, 2019).
25. See IRS Chief Couns. Notice CC-2019-006 (Sept. 17, 2019);
Sean M. Akins, Clutching to Fiat: The IRS’s Continued Pursuit of Judicial
Deference, 164 Tax Notes Fed. 2255 (Sept. 30, 2019).
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guidance document”; this may or may not be intended to supersede the
apparent allowance of subregulatory guidance in the Policy Statement.26
Importantly, these general policies are not particularly sticky.
Either of these policies could be waived or applied creatively by the Treasury or the President, respectively. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the
Treasury Department issued temporary regulations claiming good cause
for an APA exception from the usual notice and comment procedures.27
Moreover, executive orders or policy statements can be reversed without any public participation.28
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I notes that taxpayers
call for rules on which they may rely, while the government also needs
to craft more limiting rules to constrain tax avoidance. Safe harbors
would be welcome by the public and difficult to challenge, whereas limiting rules are increasingly subject to challenge. Part II surveys challenges to rules under the APA, including some nuances in the tax
administration. In Part III, the Article integrates the administrative law
literature on remedial restraint. In short, courts and scholars should not
neglect the rule of prejudicial error. Part IV seeks to limit and clarify
the tax administration’s friction with the APA. It argues that there is
ample play in the joints under existing law for tax rules and regulations
to qualify for the APA exception for interpretative rules. It explains how
the retroactivity provisions of the I.R.C. may also be able to limit the
impact of errors.29 The Article concludes that a robust application of
harmless error to the tax administration may save many rules. It cautions that robust and diverse public participation cannot be ensured by
even a strict compliance approach and calls for additional attention to
this problem.
I. Tax Rules Provide (Un)Welcome “Guidance”
Before proceeding to the problem of procedural challenges to tax rules,
this section provides a brief background on two of the most critical functions of tax rules. Although there are undoubtedly more, two of the

26. Exec. Order No. 13,891, Promoting the Rule of Law Through
Improved Agency Guidance Documents, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 15, 2019).
27. See T.D. 9865, 84 Fed. Reg. 28,398, 28,405 (June 18, 2019).
28. Cf. Andrew Velarde, Drafts of Hybrid Regs Show OIRA Took
Light Touch Except with RFA, 167 Tax Notes Fed. 1438 (May 25, 2020).
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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most important goals of tax rules are to facilitate compliance and to prevent abuse. Although facilitative rules sought by taxpayers are a matter
of no small concern, these rules are highly unlikely to be challenged.
More limiting rules,30 in contrast, have come under scrutiny in the courts.
Procedural challenges have especially focused on the adequacy of explanation during the notice and comment process (or the timing or lack of
comment). This unusual enforcement reality merits attention.
It goes without saying that the tax law is ever complex and complicated. One need only look to the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 201731 to
see the diverse demands placed on the tax administration.32 All citizens
and residents, and those with business or investment in the United States,
must comply with U.S. tax law. In this arrangement, much of the tax
law’s obligation to pay is enforceable via litigation. The tax law could,
in other words, often be executed even without the promulgation of rules
by the Treasury Department.33 Even so, the Treasury Department has
sometimes gone above and beyond the legal requirements for public participation. One might expect that the point is to crack down on or deter
abuse, but the reality is that tax rules are often responsive to taxpayer
requests and facilitate their goals.34
Tax is not a domain in which agency inaction means that the
dominant interest groups will be satisfied. As the 2017 Tax Act vividly
demonstrates, Congress may enact complicated tax provisions that taxpayers would struggle to apply without guidance. Taxpayers and their

30. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Classifying Tax Guidance
According to End Users, 73 Tax Law. 245, 285 (2020) (dividing substantive
guidance into “facilitative” and “limiting” guidance, though acknowledging
that the distinction can be “thin” or “artificial”).
31. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
32. See generally Marie Sapirie, Themes in the TCJA Guidance,
162 Tax Notes 480 (Feb. 4, 2019) (noting the complexity, necessitating hundreds of pages of proposed regulations, and a need to prevent abuse).
33. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 207 (observing that “even when
Treasury uses its general authority to issue regulations for the broadest provisions of the Code, Treasury’s discretion may be constrained relative to the
discretion Congress typically has granted in other areas of law” and that
even the discretion to make adjustments to achieve clear reflection of income,
“granted in § 482 is still a far cry from an environmental or public health
delegation that empowers an agency to use its ‘judgment’ or to act ‘reasonably’”).
34. See McMahon, supra note 5, at 556.
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professional representatives routinely call for administrative action in
the form of guidance from the IRS.35
Interest groups that dominate the tax rulemaking processes tend
to seek guidance that permits simplification or tax reduction.36 These
calls for guidance may, in some instances, evidence a subtle form of
exceptionalism on the part of the tax bar. Tellingly, the IRS’s actual guidance sometimes generates an outcry because it cannot be relied upon to
avoid penalties.37 Reliance, however, is not in alignment with the consensus on “guidance” in administrative law. The creation of strong reliance interests ought to be subject to meaningful public participation. But
in tax, binding safe harbors granted to interest groups are not subject to
any meaningful check by the public.38
Stepping back from tax, an agency that rushes to bind itself can
face litigation from opposing interest groups. Although standing norms
have been changing, environmental groups or competitors who had
complied with existing rules might have some prospect of demonstrating

35. See Michael L. Schler, Letter to the Editor, Tax Regulations
and the Rule of Law, 162 Tax Notes 531 (Feb. 4, 2019); Eric Yauch, ABA Calls
for Definitional Clarity in Passthrough Regs, 159 Tax Notes 1996 (June 25,
2018).
36. See Schler, supra note 35, at 531 (noting that pro-taxpayer regulations under the TCJA are “not difficult to find” and providing examples).
37. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, McGruder
v. Mnuchin, No. 2:20-cv-03590-CFK (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2020) (raising arbitrary and capricious challenges, among other theories); William Hoffman,
Stimulus Payment Delays Spurring Challenges to IRS Guidance, 168 Tax
Notes Fed. 789 (Aug. 3, 2020); William Hoffman, IRS Relying More on Unreliable Guidance to Keep Up with Workload, 168 Tax Notes Fed. 585 (July 27,
2020) (noting downside that FAQs are not subject to notice and comment nor
suitable for reliance to avoid tax penalties).
38. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Pre-Enforcement Litigation
Needed for Taxing Procedures, 92 Wash. L. R ev. 1317, 1374–
77 (2017)
(expressing concerns about tax favoritism and providing examples); Schler,
supra note 35, at 532 (“As a result, by issuing pro-taxpayer regulations that go
beyond the language of the code, the executive branch is spending taxpayer
funds with little or no control by any other branch of government.”); Jesse
Drucker & Jim Tankersley, How Big Companies Won New Tax Breaks from
the Trump Administration, N.Y. Times (Dec. 30, 2019), https://w ww.nytimes
.com /2019/12/30 / business /t rump-t ax-cuts-beat-gilti.html [https://perma.cc
/T7KE-6VZL].
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standing to challenge environmental deregulation.39 Public interest
groups, however, almost certainly would lack standing40 to challenge a
tax safe harbor.41 “Hard look” review is no check if it is toothless due to
standing. Notwithstanding this loophole, if tax safe harbors are produced
through a notice and comment process, presumably the same process
will be required for any revocation. Although standing limitations are
not unique to tax, this phenomenon should be of concern for the viability of public participation legitimating rulemaking.
Tax and non-tax administration obviously are not just about providing guidance in a facilitative spirit. The government also needs to
be able to compel compliance to ensure fairness and prevent abuse.
Although interest groups are entitled to participate in some rulemaking
processes, their views should not have the same weight as the agency
charged with administering the tax law. This should be axiomatic, at
one level, because that is the delegation that Congress has made. But
some would counter that the government’s will to win makes any
deference to the Treasury illegitimate. That narrative seems overwrought given the propensity of the tax administration to provide

39. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency
Procs. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Christopher Gallu, Jr., Who Says You Have to Play by the Same Rules:
The Competitor Standing Doctrine After Lujan, 64 Geo. Wash. L. R ev. 1205,
1213–14 (1996); McMahon, supra note 38, at 1375–78. In other contexts, when
they have access to relevant information, third parties can functionally regulate or facilitate the achievement of regulatory goals. See generally Rory Van
Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 Va. L.
R ev. 467, 470–71 (2020) (listing examples of third-party enforcement). Outside of compliance with withholding obligations, this also does not seem like a
promising avenue for balancing participation in tax rulemaking projects.
40. See Boris Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 118.9.4 (2020) (explaining why taxpayers rarely
meet the constitutional requirement of standing to litigate). Recent litigation
involving the donor disclosure rules for tax-
exempt organizations raises
issues of informational standing for states and does not open the door for taxpayers to sue on the basis of underenforcement of the tax law. Cf. Bullock v.
IRS, 401 F.Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019).
41. But see McMahon, supra note 38, at 1398–1402 (arguing for
creative application of injury in fact and possible waiver of defenses by the
government).
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taxpayer-friendly regulations, safe harbors, and private letter rulings.42
It is also nothing new to assume that the Treasury has broad authority
to fill in the details and that its interpretations are entitled to respect.43
Dovetailing from this less cooperative function, two sweeping
criticisms of administrative power may be anticipated. First, tax practitioners and the public often think that there is something fundamentally
unfair about the Treasury Department issuing regulations that are then
applied to tax returns under examination, particularly if courts are likely
to defer under Chevron or related doctrines.44 This ship sailed some time
ago.45 Tax may actually be less suspect in this regard, with factual
42. See Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement,
69 Tax L. R ev. 73, 85 (2015); Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law
in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 834 (2012).
43. See Camp, supra note 5, at 1702 (noting that in early tax jurisprudence, “all regulations properly enacted should receive heightened deference” and that arguably “there was neither a distinction between legislative
and interpretative regulations, nor a distinction between specific and general
regulatory authority”).
44. As Professor Steve Johnson has documented, the initial reception from the tax bar was hostility and trepidation to Chevron deference to tax
regulations:
The reaction to Mayo from the community of taxpayers and
their representatives has been decidedly negative. The most
important aspect of this reaction has been the fear that
Mayo radically tilts the “playing field” in favor of the Service, making it difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers to
effectively challenge Treasury regulations in many cases.
Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo
Era, 32 Va. Tax R ev. 269, 272 (2012). To the extent that the Treasury is engaging in specification under a delegation rather than interpretation, the frame is
even more off base. See Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power, 168 U. Pa. L.
R ev. 689, 693 (2020) (urging against conflating “interpretation” and “specification” and supporting the specification power); see also Nicholas R. Bednar
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 Geo. Wash. L. R ev. 1392,
1461 (2017) (concluding that “casting Chevron as administrative law’s bogeyman has always been a bit overwrought” and that its “basic premises represent a reasonable judicial response to the government we actually have”).
45. See John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional
Restoration, 51 Duke L.J. 901, 916 (2001) (critiquing such expansion of
agency discretion as circumventing bicameralism and presentment).
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determinations in an audit subject to de novo review in court.46 Even
sound legal conclusions are at some risk of jury nullification in refund
court.
Second, although the tax authority needs to have power to combat abuse effectively, history suggests that presidents have pressured
the IRS to pursue political opponents.47 Whether or not the pressure was
effective, there has certainly been a problem of appearance.48 In general, however, one would expect that rulemaking checks, rather than
enables, agency discretion.49 Promoting rules rather than ad hoc enforcement would seem to be protective in this context. Moreover, nothing
about public participation in an informal rulemaking seems particularly
helpful toward limiting political pressure, or the potential appearance
of political pressure. Nor would the impact of politics seem uniquely limited to tax administration.
Ultimately, tax rules should enhance the fairness of the system. Our tax system depends, to an important extent, on voluntary
compliance of taxpayers.50 Consequently, taxpayer morale is critical to
the function of the system. And taxpayer morale suffers if the public
perceives that different rules apply to similarly situated taxpayers. To
the extent tax rules stand on shaky footing, they lose the ability to
ensure compliance and deter abuse. In addition, the unreviewable creation of reliance interests in non-enforcement represents a substantial concern for the integrity of the system. Both of these de facto tax
cuts will go to those who are willing to risk litigation and will be

46. See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 5, at 267–68.
47. See John A. Andrew, III, Power to Destroy: The Political
Uses of the IRS from K ennedy to Nixon 4–5 (2002); Joseph J. Thorndike,
IRS Stalking of Political Groups Under Kennedy and Nixon, 139 Tax Notes
844 (May 20, 2013).
48. See Thorndike, supra note 47.
49. Cf. Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 Admin. L. R ev. 717, 751–52 (2001) (explaining that in the Civil War era, “[k]nowledge of secret precedents had made
Bureau employees extremely valuable to corporate taxpayers, fostering a
damaging rate of turnover” so “[o]nly the regular publication of BIR decisions could halt this outflow and ensure equal treatment for all taxpayers”).
50. See infra Part III.C.3 (explaining why self-assessment and voluntary compliance are particularly important for effective tax administration).
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especially concentrated in the hands of wealthy taxpayers.51 This Article next examines the likely procedural challenges to tax rules under
the APA.
II. Challenges to Agency Rules
This Part outlines how agency rules are challenged and identifies important nuances of tax administration. In 1946, the APA created a template
for all federal agencies to follow.52 The APA had four overarching purposes: to allow the public to be informed of agency organization, procedures, and rules; to allow for public participation in rulemaking; to
impose standard procedures for on the record hearings and (less commonly) formal rulemaking; and to codify judicial review of agency
action.53
The issues for tax administration defy easy characterization; a
sketch of the most important and likely challenges follows. First, may
the IRS and Treasury Department invite public comment after issuing
regulations (or, for that matter, subregulatory authority)?54 Next, and
perhaps most important: how does “hard look” review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA square with a system that may
well allow courts to keep looking many years after a rule has been
promulgated?55 Although it may relate to substance and process,

51. See Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 Tax L. R ev. 617, 652,
665 (2016) (concluding that “the political process is unlikely to resolve the
problems faced by invisible taxpayers” and that they lack standing to assert
their interests).
52. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L.
R ev. 1557 (1996) (examining the political history of the APA).
53. Tom C. Clark, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General’s Manual on the A dministrative Procedure Act 9 (1947) [hereinafter Attorney
General’s Manual].
54. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure
Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 Notre Dame L. R ev. 1727, 1740–59 (2007);
Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 266–67 (noting the scope of the problem extends beyond the tax administration).
55. John Kendrick, Note, (Un)Limiting Administrative Review:
Wind River, Section 2401(a), and the Right to Challenge Federal Agencies,
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questions have arisen concerning the retroactivity provisions in the
I.R.C.56 Finally, when a procedural error occurs, what is the appropriate remedy?57
As explained in Part I, much of the litigation to date has centered on binding tax rules. Nonbinding tax guidance as well as authoritative safe harbors have not led to as much controversy. Perhaps these
pronouncements could not be challenged, given the difficulty of establishing general taxpayer standing.58 The analysis is further complicated
by the Anti-Injunction Act, which has been construed to prohibit taxpayers from challenging tax rules without first engaging in a transaction and risking tax liability.59 Finally, if the I.R.C. can be taken at face
value, tax administration may be guided by some non-standard principles. But scholars contest the extent to which the APA changes the traditional understanding of the I.R.C.60

103 Va. L. R ev. 157, 178 (2017) (“No other source seriously engages with the
Wind River doctrine.”).
56. See Lederman, supra note 5; Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 Geo. Wash. L.
R ev. 1558 (2011); James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 Fla. St. U. L. R ev. 349 (2013).
57. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 286–302 (identifying five analytical approaches to postpromulgation comment, which may militate toward vacatur, remand without vacatur, or no remedy at all); Hoffer &
Walker, supra note 5, at 284, 289–93 (explaining the potential benefits of
remands for agency decisionmaking and the path an iterative dialog between
agencies and courts might follow).
58. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 40, ¶ 118.9.4 (explaining
why taxpayers rarely meet the constitutional requirement of standing to challenge tax rules that have not been enforced against such taxpayer).
59. I.R.C. § 7421(a); Hickman, supra note 5, at 530 (indicating that
pre-enforcement review of tax rules is “a rarity”); Kristin E. Hickman & Gerald Kerska, Restoring the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, 103 Va. L. R ev. 1683,
1688–90 (2017) (questioning a broad interpretation, which could “shield many
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents from judicial review altogether”).
60. See sources cited supra note 5 (noting the recent scholarly dialogue about tax exceptionalism); see also infra Part IV.B (arguing that the
I.R.C.’s retroactivity provisions are consistent with the APA).
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A. Impermissibility Under the Organic Statute
The APA prescribes a trial-like system for hearings “on the record” at
an agency.61 To ensure impartiality, there is a separation of functions
between prosecutorial staff and administrative law judges.62 There is
also a prohibition on ex parte contact, consistent with the assumption
of a decision based on the record.63
A reviewing court, in general, defers to the results of formal
adjudication, generally under the substantial evidence test for questions
of fact.64 The agency typically receives deference under Chevron for
rules and interpretations that are announced in formal adjudications or
notice and comment rulemaking.65 If the Chevron framework applies to
an agency interpretation, a court should first determine whether Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue, and if not, the
court may not disturb an agency rule unless it is “arbitrary or capricious
in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”66
Taxpayers, however, are not required to resolve a tax deficiency
or refund claim at the IRS.67 Whether the forum is the Tax Court, district court, or Court of Federal Claims, the facts are determined de
novo.68 Consequently, Congress has afforded the Treasury Department
and IRS less capacity to make binding policy through adjudication. That

61. 5 U.S.C. § 554.
62. Id. § 554(d).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 706(2)(E).
65. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219, 231 (2001)
(“Thus, the overwhelming number of cases applying Chevron deference have
reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
66. Id. at 227.
67. See I.R.C. §§ 6015(e), 6212(a), (c), 6213(a); Michael Saltzman
& Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 1.03[4] (2020).
68. See Saltzman & Book, supra note 67, ¶ 1.07. This analysis
applies to deficiency determinations and refund claims. Certain narrowly
confined matters, however, arguably should not be reviewed de novo. Specifically, Hoffer and Walker argue that discretion whether to grant equitable
relief for innocent spouses, as well as determinations regarding collection due
process, is reserved for the IRS. See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 5.
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is because its tax return review is informal adjudication, not a hearing
“on the record,” and thus unlikely to qualify for Chevron deference.69
B. Timing of APA-Based Challenges to Rules
Federal court doctrines of standing and ripeness prescribe when challenges to agency action may be brought. Regulated groups often challenge a new administrative rule as soon as it is published.70 Although
such litigation is costly and can be disruptive, pre-enforcement review
means the agency and the public can relatively quickly know whether
the rule is invalid. Following the approach set forth in Wind River,71 most
of the U.S. Courts of Appeal have held that the statute of limitations provides the agency with repose from procedural challenges after six
years, so that there is a limited potential for surprise long after the rule
has been issued.72

69. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S at 218.
70. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 520. Professor Hickman summarizes the typical timing of APA claims:
Another key feature of the APA is its designation of the
courts as a meaningful check against agency exercises of
rulemaking power. Since the Court’s decision in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner in 1967, courts have interpreted
the APA as establishing a presumption in favor of pre-
enforcement judicial review of agency rulemaking efforts.
Thus, regulated parties ordinarily may challenge the validity of legally binding agency rules in court as soon as the
agency finalizes them, before the rules become too
entrenched. In other words, regulated parties are not left
with a choice between incurring the costs to organize their
primary behavior to conform with arguably invalid rules or
suffering the uncertainty and potential penalties of
noncompliance.
Id. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted).
71. Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710
(9th Cir. 1991); see also Hyatt v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 904 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
72. See Kendrick, supra note 55, at 175.
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APA-based challenges to tax rules typically involve the notice
and comment procedure or the arbitrary and capricious standard. There
may be some overlap between arbitrary and capricious challenges and
substantive arguments based on the organic statute, though the distinction can be material:
State Farm is used to evaluate whether a rule is procedurally defective as a result of flaws in the agency’s
decision-making process. Chevron, by contrast, is generally used to evaluate whether the conclusion reached
as a result of that process—an agency’s interpretation
of a statutory provision it administers—is reasonable.
A litigant challenging a rule may challenge it under
State Farm, Chevron, or both.73
In case of substantive invalidity, the agency cannot subsequently adopt
the interpretation. In contrast, in case of procedural invalidity, an
agency could on remand adopt the same interpretation with an appropriate process.
Then-Judge Kavanaugh distinguished a “lack-of-reasoned-
explanation claim” as “a more modest claim that the agency has failed
to adequately address all of the relevant factors or to adequately explain
its exercise of discretion in light of the information before it.”74 However, as the taxpayer’s Tax Court victory in Altera exemplifies, a reasonable interpretation could be overturned for inadequate explanation.
Taxpayers rarely may bring stand-alone procedural challenges
to tax rules.75 That is because courts have construed the Anti-Injunction
Act to bar facial challenges to tax rules; taxpayers must wait until a
73. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd., Inc. v. EPA, 846
F.3d 492, 521 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
74. Multicultural Media, Telecom & Internet Council v. FCC, 873
F.3d 932, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
75. For more exhaustive treatments of this issue, see Leslie Book &
Marilyn Ames, The Morass of the Anti-Injunction Act: A Review of the Cases
and Major Issues, 73 Tax Law. 773 (2020); Hickman & Kerska, supra note
59, at 1764 (arguing that courts should “rediscover lost limitations on the
AIA’s reach”); Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism:
Expanding Access to Judicial Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 Admin. L.
R ev. 73 (2014) (criticizing imbalance and insulation of tax-exempt status
determinations from review); McMahon, supra note 38, at 1362–74.
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deficiency is asserted or a refund claimed.76 Moreover, even without
this hurdle, the constitutional requirement of standing is notoriously
difficult to satisfy by taxpayers against whom a rule has not already
been applied by the IRS to that taxpayer’s detriment.77Associations78
and states79 have, to be sure, attempted to chip away at the edges of the
standing roadblock. The Supreme Court may soon shed new light on
the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.80
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Altera, APA challenges are
arising in tax cases following an unusual time sequence:
Generally, strict APA-based challenges arise in the
pre-enforcement context, which is less disruptive to
the agency and which allows plaintiffs to avoid the six-
year statute of limitations applicable to APA-based
challenges. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401. By contrast, post-
enforcement challenges, often brought after the six-year
statute of limitations, are rarely brought under the APA,
even if the APA proves relevant. Rather, courts are generally called on to address the degree of deference to
which the agency is entitled. In these typical post-
enforcement challenges, the ultimate question is not
whether the agency action was procedurally defective

76. See Hickman & Kerska, supra note 59, at 1692–93 (criticizing
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence). But see Silver v. IRS, No. 1:19-cv-00247,
2019 WL 7168625, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019) (asking whether the suit is
“fundamentally a ‘tax collection claim’”); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d
717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing APA claim without a refund claim because
there was “no other adequate remedy at law”); Ryan Finley, Suit Challenging
Transition Tax Regs Can Proceed to Merits, 166 Tax Notes Fed. 155 (Jan. 6,
2020).
77. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 40, ¶ 118.9.4.
78. See Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY,
2017 WL 4682050, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017).
79. See Bullock v. IRS, 401 F.Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019).
80. See CIC Servs., LLC. v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding AIA precluded pre-enforcement review), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
2737 (2020); Fla. Bankers Ass’n, 799 F.3d 1065, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a pre-enforcement challenge to interest income reporting requirements);
see also McMahon, supra note 38, at 1363–69.
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but rather whether it was a permissible exercise of executive authority.81
In Altera, the government was invited to argue that the statute of limitations barred the procedural challenge. Perhaps surprisingly, the government took the position that the six-year statute of limitations on
APA-based challenges did not apply.82
Despite the Commissioner’s position, the six-year statute of limitations may be jurisdictional.83 Because it is not a plaintiff-centered
rule, the Wind River doctrine often operates unfairly.84 On the other
hand, the necessity of risking tax liability to challenge a rule likely chills
procedural challenges to tax rules.85 But the timing of the challenge
means there is no repose for the government; this could also lead to disruption and inequity. If the statute of limitations is tolled or non-
jurisdictional, these considerations could potentially impact a court’s
analysis at the remedy stage, if it finds inadequate explanation for a tax
rule.86

81. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497, 2018 WL
3542989, at *10 n.6 (9th Cir. July 24, 2018), withdrawn by 898 F.3d 1266
(9th Cir. 2018) (withdrawn to allow for reconstituted panel).
82. See Letter-Brief in Response to the Court’s Order Dated September 28, 2018, at 4, Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497
(9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018), 2018 WL 4929717, at *4 (“In sum, it is the Commissioner’s position that the six-year statute of limitations that is generally applicable to procedural challenges to regulations under the APA, see 28 U.S.C. §
2401(a), does not apply to this case.”).
83. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331,
1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional); Konecny v. United States, 388 F.2d 59, 61–62 (8th Cir. 1967) (jurisdictional); cf. Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dictum
suggesting that the six-year statute of limitations would be jurisdictional).
84. Cf. Kendrick, supra note 55, at 191–92 (observing that the doctrine is not plaintiff-centered and “bars claims of plaintiffs who do not yet
exist and claims of existing plaintiffs who are not yet ‘adversely affected or
aggrieved’ by the agency’s action” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702)).
85. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 530; Hickman, supra note 54, at
1804–05 (taxpayers unwilling to risk enforcement action rather than comply
with rules that may be procedurally defective).
86. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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C. “Hard Look” Review
The APA requires agency action of any modality to flow from a reasoned decisionmaking process.87 At a high level of generality, it is hard
to quarrel with this principle. But the application in the courts of this
“hard look” doctrine can be unpredictable and demanding:
One difficulty with hard look review is that the doctrine
imposes no limits on the size, number, detail, or technicality of the issues that can be raised. Moreover, the
level of review that is required for an agency rule to be
upheld is not predictable; Professor Jerry Mashaw
argues that courts function as “rob[]ed roulette wheels”
when reviewing agency guidance. Agencies must
decide whether to devote resources to the rebuttal of
possibly meaningless comments without knowing
courts’ expectations, so agencies may rationally devote
too much or too little resources to the process from a
judicial perspective.88
The Treasury Department has been fairly sparing in its response to comments and instead has explained more descriptively how the rules in its
regulations work.
Consequently, as others have observed, an uncharitable application of hard look review to tax rules could be fatal to most tax rules.89
This could be particularly disruptive if the six-year statute of limitations
does not apply in tax controversies. For example, Altera filed a petition
with the Tax Court based on a notice of deficiency issued in 2011.
Its APA-based claims related to regulations promulgated in 2003. This
is anomalous under the Wind River doctrine,90 barring procedural

87. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. R ev. 393, 394 (2000).
88. McMahon, supra note 5, at 579 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance 181 (1999)).
89. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 471; Wallace, supra note 5,
at 189.
90. See supra Part II.B.
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challenges under the six-year statute of limitations. By contrast, in a typical enforcement action, a challenger would need to show that the rule
is impermissible under the statute.91
On the merits of the APA claims in Altera, the Tax Court unanimously invalidated the regulation for inadequate explanation.92 The regulation provided that certain related parties must apportion the cost of
stock options issued by one of the related parties.93 This approach would
superficially appear quite reasonable; moreover, one might argue that
such an approach is almost compelled by the legislative history, which
was concerned with shifting profits overseas.94 But the Tax Court’s “hard
look” review rejected the Treasury Department’s curt dismissal of comments from taxpayers opposing the proposal and concluded that the
decision lacked a basis in fact.95
Although the government ultimately emerged victorious, this
litigation may be a good example of Mashaw’s “robed roulette” metaphor.96 The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s unanimous decision,
on the theory that Treasury’s process was clear enough. The central
argument for the taxpayer was that the Treasury had an obligation to
examine, and explain away, comments that detailed transactions involving unrelated entities.97 But the Treasury found these comments irrelevant under the commensurate with income standard.98 As the Ninth
Circuit explained, reversing the Tax Court, “exhaustive, contemporaneous legal arguments”99 are not necessary to sustain a rulemaking; it is
sufficient if the “regulatory path may be reasonably discerned.”100 In
keeping with this framework, the preamble indicated adequately that the

91. As Professor Wallace explains, even if a rule is not defective
under the APA, the robustness of the procedure used may be relevant for deference doctrines. Wallace, supra note 5, at 189.
92. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), rev’d, 926 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2019).
93. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–7A(d)(2).
94. See Altera, 926 F.3d at 1070–71; Wallace, supra note 5, at 228.
95. Altera, 145 T.C. at 122–25.
96. Supra text accompanying note 88.
97. See Altera, 936 F.3d at 1081.
98. Id. at 1081.
99. Id. at 1083 (quoting Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 515 (4th Cir. 2011)).
100. Id. at 1086.
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regulation would align with the commensurate with income standard
and cited the legislative history supporting that choice.101
Agencies would prefer not to delay action as well as consume
limited resources addressing comments, particularly if the comments
are essentially heckling or fail to raise substantial concerns. But different judges deploy State Farm review differently.102 At bottom, if agencies must exhaustively document their decisions, even with respect to
comments that are arguably immaterial, then their work surely has to
slow down or at least narrow in scope.
D. Notice and Comment and Related Problems of Retroactivity
Courts look to the organic statute to determine whether Congress has
made a delegation to a particular agency.103 Assuming that an agency
has the power to make rules, the APA provides a relatively informal
process unless the organic statute requires a hearing on the record.104
This “notice and comment” process allows the agency to formulate a
proposed rule and gives the public an opportunity to comment.105 An

101. Id. at 1083–84.
102. Numerous scholarly proposals have sought to mitigate or
shape the uncertainty surrounding “hard look” review. See, e.g., Frank B.
Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 Va.
L. R ev. 1243 (1999) (abolition); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 Harv. L. R ev. 2245 (2001) (sliding scale); Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 Wash. L. R ev. 419, 425 (2009)
(rational basis with bite); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992) (minimum rationality); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
Admin. L. R ev. 59 (1995) (rationality review akin to the scrutiny employed
under the Due Process Clause); Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 22 (urging
courts to be flexible about accepting certain post hoc justifications for rules);
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321 (2010) (presumption of validity if balanced representation).
103. See, e.g., Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches
Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 Geo. Wash. L. R ev. 479, 506–15 (1995).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
105. Id.
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agency often makes no changes in the final rule but rather explains why
it disagrees with important negative feedback.106
The APA requires 30 days’ notice before a final rule may take
effect.107 As the Supreme Court explained in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, “Retroactivity is not favored in the law. . . . 
and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.”108 Moreover, “[b]y the same
principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not,
as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in
express terms.”109
The APA carves out an exception for “interpretative rules,”
“general statements of policy,” and for “good cause.”110 Because of taxpayer standing limitations, it is unlikely that much litigation will arise in
tax about the distinction between interpretative rules and general
statements of policy. The good cause exception would seem ill-fitting
for tax rulemaking.111 However, the content of the “interpretative rules”
exception would appear most important for tax disputes. Interpretative
rules are not required to undergo notice and comment and may be applied
retroactively even without a specific statutory authorization of
retroactivity.
Because the I.R.C. does not require tax rules to be made after a
hearing on the record, the APA “notice and comment” framework
applies to tax rulemaking. In addition, courts will eventually have to
construe the I.R.C. provisions on retroactivity of tax rules in light of the
APA. This is complicated by the difficulty in applying the concept of
“interpretative rules,” which is compounded by the role of judicial deference and, relatedly, the Treasury’s practice of inviting comments on
proposed regulations that it claims are interpretative.

106. See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. Pitt. L. R ev. 589, 620–30 (2002).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
108. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
109. Id.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d).
111. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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Until 1996, retroactive application of tax rules to the enactment
of the relevant statutory provision was the presumption.112 For regulations relating to newer statutory provisions, retroactivity is generally
limited to the date of the notice of proposed rulemaking.113 There is an
18-month rule allowing retroactivity for regulations implementing new
tax acts114 as well as an unlimited time frame to prevent abuse.115 It is
unclear whether these provisions are intended to curtail retroactivity of
interpretative rules or, more broadly, could permit even Treasury’s legislative rules to be backdated retroactively.116
The I.R.C. also acknowledges that Treasury issues “temporary
regulations,” requiring that the notice of proposed rulemaking simultaneously invite comments and that the rule expire within three years if
not finalized.117 In a group of related tax cases, courts had split on whether
the temporary/final process is permissible.118 There are emerging

112. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101, 110
Stat. 1462, 1468–69 (1996); see also McMahon, supra note 5, at 586–87.
113. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1).
114. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2).
115. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
116. See infra Part IV.B.
117. I.R.C. § 7805(e).
118. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding temporary regulations assuming for the sake of
argument that the procedure was defective), vacated by 2012 WL 2371486
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (indicating that the process is mooted by finalization of temporary regulations), vacated by 566 U.S. 971 (2012); Beard v. Comm’r, 633
F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (indicating in dictum that temporary regulations
would not be procedurally invalid), vacated by 566 U.S. 971 (2012); Burks v.
United States, 633 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing the resulting final regulations while questioning the effect of the process on the deference framework to be applied); Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Lederman, supra note 5, at 683–87 (summarizing the jurisprudence on temporary regulations promulgated amid litigation). The procedural
holdings of those cases were mooted by the Supreme Court’s holding that the
regulation was an impermissible construction of the statute of limitations.
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 480 (2012)
(“Following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, we hold that the provision does not
apply to an overstatement of basis. Hence the 6-year period does not apply.”
(citation omitted)).
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indications from the Supreme Court that this process may be less problematic than commentators had assumed.119
E. Remedies for the Violation of APA Requirements
The standard remedy for violation of an APA rulemaking requirement
is to vacate the rule and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration. In tandem with vacatur, the APA’s delayed effective date
requirement can then “derail or delay” an administrative program:
Rectifying the mistake may be no mean feat, especially
if doing so requires the agency to trudge through
the procedural thicket surrounding notice and comment. In the meantime, the agency action will be put
on hold—
delayed, often for years, as the agency
decides how to respond. In the end, the agency might
choose to abandon the action altogether: Its priorities
may have changed, its staff may have been reassigned, or the external groups supporting action may
have dispersed.120
If an agency’s rule is vacated and the agency must start the rulemaking over, the effective date of the rule would be pushed even later. And
if the vacated rule is necessary to enforce the organic statute, then
enforcement would need to await finalization of a new rule.121
Courts have often, but not always, insisted upon compliance
with the APA’s procedures. Two important doctrinal workarounds are
the harmless error standard and the remedy of remand without vacatur.122 However, as Professor Nicholas Bagley explains, “the presumptive
remedy is vacatur, whether or not the agency has solicited further

119. See infra Part III.B.2.
120. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 263.
121. See generally Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial
Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L.J. 291,
299 (2003) (explaining the standard remedy of vacatur and noting instances
of forbearance).
122. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5; Levin, supra
note 121.
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comments.”123 Although Hickman and Thomson largely agree with this
approach,124 Bagley is far more skeptical and, outside of the tax context,
discusses several “odd results” that may obtain.125
If the backdating provisions under the I.R.C. apply to all rules,
not just interpretative rules, this might permit a functional equivalent
of remand without vacatur.126 Suppose the Treasury Department inadequately responds to a comment in a rulemaking; it might consider the
comment and re-issue the rule, applying the rule to prior taxable periods.127 Similarly, if a temporary regulation were invalidated on grounds
of postpromulgation comment, perhaps the Treasury Department may
start again and treat the temporary regulation as “notice” of the later
rule for backdating purposes.128
III. R emedial R estraint
Just as tax scholars should benefit from insights from other fields,129 it
is important to borrow critically and carefully from administrative law.
However, in early stages of borrowing, it may be particularly difficult
to avoid literalism because of limited contextual knowledge.130 As this
Part explains, nuance surrounding the APA and remedial doctrines
should not be conflated with tax exceptionalism. The APA and the
Supreme Court are clear that there is a place for the rule of prejudicial
error, although the Court has given very little guidance on how to distinguish harmless error. The “remedial purity” approach need not be the
standard by which the tax administration measures compliance.131

123. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 285.
124. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5.
125. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 285–89.
126. See Puckett, supra note 5, at 1095–1101.
127. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1).
128. See id.
129. See generally Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 15, at 666
(suggesting that a “robust tax jurisprudence” needs exposure to other fields
of law).
130. Cf. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 309 (“It feels
right to read remedial inflexibility into the APA, even if that’s not what the
APA says.”).
131. Id. (criticizing “the norm of remedial purity”); Shapiro &
Murphy, supra note 22, at 332 (noting the “administrative law comedy” in the
“transformation” of procedures by the D.C. Circuit in the face of the Supreme
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A. The Rule of Prejudicial Error
As discussed above, courts faced with a defective agency rule typically
vacate the rule and remand it for further consideration at the agency.132
Bagley argues that the APA supposed judicial review would be with a
“light touch” and that courts mostly forgot about the rule of prejudicial
error for decades.133 Without providing much gloss on the meaning of
the concept, the Supreme Court has cited the rule occasionally.134 Moreover, “as courts in the 1970s intensified the rigors of notice and comment to accord with their views about what it ought to accomplish, so
too could courts today adjust what the rule of prejudicial error entails.”135
The case for remedial purity is relatively straightforward:
The sign fallacy and the focusing illusion help explain
the enduring appeal of remedial purity in administrative law. It’s true that excusing more agency mistakes
would give agencies greater latitude to make those mistakes. If you assume that the incentive effect is large,
cutting agencies slack will lead directly to the rise of
procedurally defective and poorly reasoned rules. To
discourage bad behavior, it’s essential to swiftly and
severely punish agencies when they err. Courts thus
embrace a rigid remedial rule, confident that they need
not worry unduly about the costs of disrupting agency
business. Those costs must pale in comparison to the
damage that unrestrained agencies could inflict.136

Court’s “categorical refusal to allow judicial usurpation of control over
rulemaking procedures”).
132. See supra Part II.E.
133. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 258–59.
134. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2385 (2020); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.
396, 406 (2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 659–60 (2007).
135. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 291.
136. Id. at 313.

306

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 24:1

This approach almost invariably leads to vacatur of defective agency
rules. However, a somewhat more charitable view can flow from this
general approach.
Hickman and Thomson resist the trend to vacate upon finding
any defect.137 For example, postpromulgation comment can sometimes
adequately open a rulemaking to public participation. In any event, they
advise courts to explicitly adopt a strong presumption against the agency
that missteps.138 And they would explicitly place the burden of persuasion on the agency to rebut the presumption.139 Bagley acknowledges that
Hickman and Thomson are “unusually attentive” to the benefits of
nuanced analysis at the remedy stage.140 Ultimately, Bagley assesses a
“strong presumption against” postpromulgation comment as an example of the sign fallacy.141
The APA’s text instructs courts to take “due account” of “the
rule of prejudicial error.”142 Courts have often, but not always, construed
harmless error narrowly, refusing to remand a procedurally defective
rule without vacatur.143 However, the purpose of procedural requirements
should be the focus on review of alleged defects rather than insistence
on perfect adherence to form. Scholars have long recognized that vacatur can be extraordinarily costly.144 Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian
Vermeule found that “hard look” review can be relatively flexible in
practice, perhaps to compensate if the standard remedy would be
disproportionate.145

137. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 322.
138. See id. at 310.
139. See id. at 312.
140. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 312.
141. Id.
142. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
143. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 285–86, 291, 294
(summarizing the “muddle” of decisions).
144. See, e.g., Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 263
n.65 (citing Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto
Safety (1990); R. Shep Melnick, R egulation and the Courts: The Case of
the Clean A ir Act (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of
Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to
the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 Admin. L. R ev. 7 (1991)); see also supra
note 16.
145. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review,
114 Mich. L. R ev. 1355, 1361–67 (2016) (concluding that the implications
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Professor Bagley has recommended an “invigorated” rule of
prejudicial error with the burden on the challenger:
Instead of presuming harm, why not insist on a
demonstration of prejudice before invalidating agency
rules? There’s no magic in strict adherence to notice-
and-comment formalities. As a matter of due process,
notice and comment isn’t required. The “good cause”
exception, available when “notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,” affords courts one reason
to excuse compliance with the notice-and-comment
rules. But the existence of one excuse doesn’t imply
the nonexistence of others. To the contrary, the rule of
prejudicial error applies, per § 706, to judicial review
of any agency action, including informal rulemaking.
Just as courts in the 1970s intensified the rigors of
notice and comment to accord with their views about
what it ought to accomplish, so too could courts today
adjust what the rule of prejudicial error entails. For
notice-and-comment cases, the rule could easily be
understood to require courts to undertake a context-
sensitive inquiry into prejudice.146
A downside of this approach, as Bagley acknowledges, is that “Courts
would face the taxing responsibility of sifting an expansive record to
determine whether the parties challenging the rule suffered any real
harm from the procedural violation.”147
But, as Bagley anticipates, “the questions can’t be avoided”;
defenders of reflexive vacatur “must believe that adhering strictly to procedural rules has a big and salutary effect on the substance of agency
decisions.”148 It is not, however, apparent that remedial restraint would
cause oppression, quality reduction, or block interested parties from

from the Supreme Court’s holdings are “to apply a thin form of rationality
review”).
146. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 290–91 (footnotes omitted).
147. Id. at 292.
148. Id. at 314.
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participating. That is true even if judicial restraint aligns with undesirable incentives at the agency. “Competing incentives—to do the job
right while preserving agency resources, to preserve credibility, to
assuage interest groups and congressional overseers, to avoid litigation
if at all possible—will usually swamp the incentives created by modest
adjustments to remedial doctrine.”149
Ensuring a robust role for harmless error seems superior to strict
compliance. To that extent, the Hickman and Thomson proposal provides clarity and may improve upon a strict approach to APA compliance.150 On the other hand, if harmless error review turns out to be a
false hope, without any real application, then the review would be
a waste of agency and judicial resources. Moreover, a strong presumption against validity may open the door for bias in judicial review. At the
possible risk of committing the sign fallacy, one might question whether
judges will feel convinced that a strong presumption has been rebutted
more often when they agree with the substance of the rule. This could
introduce a troubling new element of randomness (if not illegitimacy)
into an administrative law that is tilted toward inertia.151
At bottom, neither a “strong presumption” against restraint nor
a more balanced approach would necessarily be tax exceptionalist. The
justification for restraint can be located in the APA itself and the holdings of a number of cases that have nothing in particular to do with tax.
Notably, the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement seems to
remind courts to take harmless error more seriously.152

149. Id.
150. See id. at 289–90 (arguing that notice and comment is often
unnecessary for encouraging feedback but noting that courts more often take
a “purist approach” to defects concerning notice and comment).
151. See Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 22, at 359–60 (contesting that administrative law is evenhanded and positing that it has “an
identifiably libertarian, anti-statist tilt”); Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119
Mich. L. R ev. 455 (2020).
152. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2367 (2020); infra text accompanying notes
172 to 181.
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B. Circumstances Indicative of Harmless Error
This section reviews the principal factual considerations identified in
the literature that may motivate a court to exercise remedial restraint.
Although there are other types of procedural challenges beyond inadequate explanation and irregularities relating to notice and comment, this
Article focuses on those scenarios, given their relative importance to tax
administration. Although there is no guarantee that a court will agree
with a case against remedial purity, the Supreme Court has recently signaled the validity of the rule of prejudicial error.
1. Inadequate Explanation
Professor Richard Murphy has argued that vacatur for inadequate explanation calls for “sound discretion” rather than “application of a falsely
categorical rule” against post hoc rationalizations.153 Murphy surveys
what he dubs instances of “Chenery cheating” or “playing the harmless
error card.”154 Professors Sidney Shapiro and Murphy argue that courts
should be more receptive to post hoc rationalizations by agencies, at least
if “the underlying information supporting these arguments was disclosed to outside scrutiny during the rulemaking process.”155
Murphy has outlined a host of factors that should be taken into
account in exercising the court’s discretion:
• Whether the post hoc rationale was offered early enough
in the process to avoid wasting court time or sandbagging
litigants;
• Whether the reviewing court has substantial grounds for significant doubt as to whether the post hoc rationale accords
with the views of the agency itself;
• Whether there are reasonable grounds for the agency’s failure
to include the post hoc rationale in a contemporaneous
explanation;

153. Richard Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on
the Duty to Give Reasons, 80 U. Cin. L. R ev. 817, 822 (2012).
154. Id. at 858, 864 & n.233.
155. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 22, at 362.
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• Whether repeating a vacated action would require the agency
to spend substantial resources;
• Whether the nature of the agency action subject to review
suggests that any later explanation would likely suffer from
equally serious flaws; and
• Whether vacation poses a threat to administration of an
important regulatory program.156
Murphy posits that remand without vacatur will often be appropriate.157
Effectiveness and efficiency, in context, may not be arbitrary; requiring voluminous explanations in the “concise” statement “runs counter
to a whole body of judicial precedents declaring that agencies, not
courts, are best situated to allocate scarce agency resources and that
agencies should be left to do so free of judicial intervention.”158 But
“where an agency ignores an obviously powerful objection,” courts may
enjoin enforcement during review.159
Would the cost of flexibility and restraint in this context outweigh the savings to agencies? Shapiro and Murphy respond that devoting resources to respond to comments does not necessarily improve the
resulting rules; remedial restraint does not require courts to infringe
upon agency discretion and is unlikely to cause agencies to “sandbag”
their arguments or become lazy.160
A key consideration defusing many of the potential objections
to accepting post hoc rationalizations is that “courts have, in effect,
required agencies to make something close to final policymaking decisions before issuing their proposals.”161 Because of the effort devoted to
issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, “ironically enough . . . the concise general statements that agencies publish as contemporaneous
rationales of their final rules might be better regarded as post hoc rationalizations of their proposed rules.”162 A study by Professors Oei and

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Murphy, supra note 153, at 876–77.
Id. at 877.
Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 22, at 369, 377–78.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 374–78.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 376–77.
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Osofsky examining the section 199A regulations corroborates this
intuition in the tax context and amplifies the problem of imbalanced
input into tax regulations.163
As Shapiro and Murphy demonstrate, “rationalizations should
be accepted as inevitable rather than condemned” and “rules should be
tested by their reasonability, not by agency sincerity.”164 It remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court would embrace this logic in an
appropriate case.165
2. Notice and Comment
Agencies could certainly choose to forego notice and comment improperly and intentionally seek to insulate their decisions from public participation.166 But this is not necessarily the case, and a variety of other
possibilities exist to explain an apparent problem of notice and comment.
This section summarizes the principal considerations that could persuade a court that there was no prejudicial error.
Given the goals of allowing for participation, it may be compelling if the public had fair notice of the rule by means other than a
traditional notice of proposed rulemaking.167 This is particularly true if
comments were received through informal channels. Even if there was
no real opportunity for comment, a court may be persuaded that there
is no harm to the challenger if the agency anticipated a challenger’s

163. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and
Comment: The Making of the § 199A Regulations, 69 Emory L.J. 209 (2019).
164. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 22, at 377.
165. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ., 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1908–09 (2020) (noting prohibition on post hoc rationalizations); see
also Christopher J. Walker, What the DACA Rescission Case Means for
Administrative Law: A New Frontier for Chenery I’s Ordinary Remand Rule?,
Yale J. on R egul.: Notice & Comment (June 19, 2020), https://w ww.yalejreg
.com /nc /what-the-daca-rescission-case-means-for-administrative-law-a-new
-frontier-for-chenery-is-ordinary-remand-r ule/ [https://perma.cc/2STR-Q7LF]
(questioning whether the DACA case should be taken as a warning sign for
remand without vacatur due to the unusual facts of the case and the lack of disruption due to vacatur).
166. Cf. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 317.
167. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689, 725–26
(D.C. Cir. 2016); Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 289–90.
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comments in the preamble to the rule.168 An agency interpretation relating to a binary ambiguity may have a higher chance of success under
harmless error analysis than a rule that requires a “nuanced and detailed”
analysis.169
Bagley argues that courts should be more open-minded toward
reasonable mistakes surrounding the exceptions for interpretative rules
and good cause, particularly when there are opportunities for feedback
outside the formal process.170 This is particularly acute because good
faith mistakes are unavoidable, meaning that vacatur would bring no
marginal discipline to agencies.171 Courts have not warmed much to such
arguments. The Supreme Court’s analysis in a recent case does little to
clarify this area, although it does at least point toward a continuing role
for harmless error.172
In Little Sisters of the Poor, the rollback of a contraception insurance coverage mandate was subject, among other challenges, to
an objection that postpromulgation comment violated the APA. Before
the final rules were released, a number of Departments released
“Interim Final Rules with Request for Comment” instead of a notice of
proposed rulemaking.173 The Supreme Court found this error to be
harmless. The Court stated that all of the elements required in a notice
of proposed rulemaking were present in this interim rule; the only difference was that the challenged rule had a different name than what
was required, and therefore the respondents “do not come close to

168. See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 930–33 (5th Cir.
2011). But see Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 287 (noting the
“unusual” result and that four other circuits vacated the rule); Hickman &
Thomson, supra note 5, at 286–89 (summarizing cases that view postpromulgation comment as “irretrievably flawed”).
169. See Johnson, 632 F.3d at 932; Hickman & Thomson, supra
note 5, at 297.
170. Bagley, Remedial Restraint, supra note 22, at 317.
171. See id.
172. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2385 (2020) (“We have previously noted that the rule
of prejudicial error is treated as an ‘administrative law . . . harmless error
rule’”) (omission in original; quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659–60 (2007)).
173. Id. at 2384.
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demonstrating that they experienced any harm from the title of the document, let alone have they satisfied [the] harmless error rule.”174
Citing Vermont Yankee,175 the Court rejected a searching inquiry
as to whether the Departments had remained openminded about subsequent comments.176 The Court observed that “the open-mindedness test
violates the ‘general proposition that courts are not free to impose upon
agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the
APA.’”177 The Court had noted, in explaining the sufficiency of the interim
rule for notice, that the challengers “do not—and cannot—argue that the
IFRs failed to air the relevant issues with sufficient detail for respondents to understand the Departments’ position.”178
Thus, Little Sisters superficially seems receptive to postpromulgation comment. But the opinion appears to leave open the question
of what might happen if there had been no postpromulgation comment.
This might happen if an agency claimed an APA exception such as good
cause. Moreover, even with postpromulgation comment, the opinion
does not address what would happen if the rule’s finalization was pending at the time of argument or judgment. Would a court then treat the
rule as a mere proposal or perhaps an invalid rule with legal force? Professor Hickman’s preliminary reaction seems to be that this is a naïve
way to frame the question, because agencies can move quickly to finalize an interim rule if need be.179
Although this Article has argued for judicial receptivity to postpromulgation comment, there is reason to be cautious about extrapolating from one decision with unusual facts. The Court in Little Sisters was
careful to note that the APA requires notice of proposed rulemaking
before a rule with “legal force.”180 It may be that the Court would not be
so charitable if an agency attempted to impose new obligations via
174. Id. at 2385.
175. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
176. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2385–86.
177. Id. at 2385 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990)).
178. Id. at 2384–85.
179. See Kristin E. Hickman, Did Little Sisters of the Poor Just
Gut APA Rulemaking Procedures?, Yale J. on R egul.: Notice & Comment
(Jul. 9, 2020), https://w ww.yalejreg.com/nc/did-little-sisters-of-the-poor-just
-gut-apa-r ulemaking-procedures / [https://perma.cc /GL5Z-3ATW].
180. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2386.
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interim rule rather than grant an exemption from a requirement. On the
other hand, the granting of exemptions may harm third parties and
should be treated on par with any other change. Despite the likelihood
of harm from underenforcement, rulemaking is often unnecessary for
an agency to avoid enforcing the law. So, the Court might see fit to distinguish regulation from exemption, on the theory that imposing new
obligations via interim rules impermissibly evades the APA delayed
effective date requirement.181
C. No Tax-Specific Considerations Against Remedial Restraint
As discussed above, it is not exceptional to suggest an approach
involving remedial flexibility or restraint in judicial review of agency
action. However, this Article anticipates the critique that, if anywhere,
remedial vigilance is necessary in the tax administration. As this
section explains, there is no particular cause for concern about taking this approach to tax. It would be more difficult to conclude that
such an approach is especially necessary for tax. Complexity,182 even if
combined with the importance of collecting revenue,183 does not seem
sufficient to justify a particularly distinct approach to tax administration. This Article does not make that claim. On the other hand, it
may be that occasionally the nuances of tax administration will be
seen in the assessment of harmless error, given the open-endedness of
the analysis.
There is also some truth in the idea that exceptionalism is not
all that unusual. But no matter how special every administrative agency
may be, it is clear that the tax law has long been administered very differently.184 If, in this context, the APA is concerned primarily with fair

181. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1).
182. See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t
Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 Va. Tax R ev. 517, 531 (1994)
(criticizing the view that tax law is self-contained and advocating a “synergistic” relationship between tax and other areas of law).
183. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Tax as Part of a Broken
Budget: Good Taxes Are Good Enough Cause, 2018 Mich. St. L. R ev. 513
(arguing that Congress’s assumptions regarding budget estimates are sufficient to justify judicial expansion of the “good cause” exception from the
APA’s notice and comment procedures even for legislative tax rules).
184. See supra note 43.
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notice and an opportunity to participate when new rights or obligations
are created by agencies, then one can and should assess whether tax
complies in substance even if not form. Moreover, there is no guarantee that leaning on the APA means that the Treasury Department will
issue more regulations full of safe harbors. It could resort to guidance
that gives little detail and creates little in the way of reliance interests.185
1. Congressional Control
As Professor Clint Wallace has explained, Congress exerts an unusual
degree of control over the tax system. As an anchor, consider the lack
of accountability fostered by the typical “empty standard”:186 For example, “just and reasonable” is an applicable standard for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission rates for natural gas pipelines, but “‘just
and reasonable’ describes any result the agency can explain.”187 As
another example, the Federal Communications Commission grants
broadcast licenses “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby.”188 As Michael Asimow observed, “[b]road and vague
delegations of rulemaking power to agencies are an inevitable part of
modern political life.”189
The discretion afforded by empty standards can be constrained
by presidential control and robust public participation. To the extent that
Congress provides robust limits in the first place, public participation
would seem to be less important in holding agencies accountable. In tax,
Congress has stepped up much more to the task. Wallace explains how
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) affords Congress such an unusual
ability to control tax administration. The JCT includes Senators and
Representatives as well as a staff of lawyers and economists.
The JCT’s expertise comes to bear in at least three ways. First,
the JCT staff provides advice from the beginning, comparing potential
approaches to solving a policy problem and remaining “engaged,

185. See supra text accompanying notes 311 to 312.
186. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 192 n.64.
187. Id. at 192.
188. Id. at 192 n.64 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307(a)).
189. Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The
Problem of Regulatory Costs, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1994, at 127,
137 (quoted in Wallace, supra note 5, at 193 n.65).
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providing assistance with drafting tax legislation.”190 Second, given
the JCT’s involvement in revenue estimates, it may sometimes be “possible to trace the legislative language back to those explanations.”191
Finally, the “JCT staff participates in meetings and hearings, markups,
and conference committee negotiations” and prepares conceptual
summaries.192
Wallace concludes that the “JCT’s expertise allows for Congress
consistently to legislate at a level of detail uncommon to other areas of
statutory law, accomplishing a sort of preemptive gap-filling.”193 This
is corroborated by the results of an admittedly older empirical study by
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, concluding that tax laws afford
less discretion than any other administrative domain besides patent and
Social Security.194 Moreover, the role of the JCT combined with Congress’s reliance “makes this legislative history particularly insightful as
to how tax provisions are expected to be construed and the particular
content of anticipated regulations contemporaneous with the enactment
of the legislative provisions.”195
As a result of this statutory specificity, the IRS will generally
be able to identify a statutory basis for a tax deficiency.196 This is not to
say that tax rules and regulations are useless. Agency rules may make
a statutory claim easier to resolve even if not absolutely necessary to
sustain a deficiency. The fact that tax law is heavily codified and not so
much left to the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Wallace, supra note 5, at 197.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A
Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate
Powers 196–206 (1999).
195. Wallace, supra note 5, at 202.
196. In a reviewed Tax Court opinion applying “hard look” review
to a pre-Mayo tax regulation governing conservation easements, Judge Toro’s
concurring opinion illustrates how difficult APA issues could potentially be
avoided if a court discerns an adequate statutory justification for a tax deficiency. Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180, 201 (2020)
(Toro, J., concurring) (“Since applying the text of the statute to the terms of
the easement before us suffices to resolve the dispute before the Court, there
is no need to address the much more difficult question of the validity of section 1.170A–14(g)(6), Income Tax Regs.”).
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should not be surprising. Consider how politicized and polarized the tax
legislative process has become. Congress presumably opted for specificity, at least in part, because it would not want major questions under
the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 to be undermined whenever there is a
new occupant in the White House. And even in more bipartisan times,
tax legislation has been marked by particular specificity.
Congress could well have made an intentional, rational choice
to constrain the courts from making, or nullifying,197 tax policy by facilitating action by the IRS and Treasury Department on matters where
the statute is relatively specific. Courts, as the runner-up, would be
harder to control.198 Professor Blake Emerson has argued that we should
refocus on the Progressive foundations of the administrative state.199
Although focused on “major questions,” Emerson’s central narrative
applies even more resoundingly in the context of relatively minor
questions:
The Progressives conceived of agencies as engaging the
democratic public in three ways: (1) through the implementation of democratically enacted law; (2) through
the input of the President; and (3) through deliberation
with the affected public. They presumed that agencies
would tackle ethically charged political questions, but
they aimed to ensure that they would do so in a rational and inclusive fashion. At the same time, they recognized that the extent of public participation would
need to be balanced against the requirements of efficient
state action. They were skeptical that the courts were
the best forum in which to ensure the democratic integrity of government, and thus sought to enhance the

197. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative ConstiThe Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 71–
73, 308 (2012) (describing early practice of tax nullification in state courts as
well as how judicial review could be “paralyzing, at the hands of nineteenth-
century courts and juries”).
198. Cf. Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation,
Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 Cal. L. R ev. 1529, 1552 (2018).
199. See Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102
Minn. L. R ev. 2019, 2073 (2018).
tution:
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democratic credentials of the administrative process
itself.200
Even with the President as a “powerful spokesperson for public opinion,”201 notice and comment rulemaking in the United States is more
demanding than in the European Union.202 It is critical that we strike
“an appropriate balance between deliberative integrity and efficient
protection of the public interest.”203
2. Judicial Review
Deference doctrines and complexity have not led to an abdication of the
judicial role in tax.204 All agencies are subject to judicial review, but most
do not face the prospect of litigating the facts de novo before a fully independent tribunal with special expertise in the statute being administered. Most tax cases find their way to Tax Court, allowing a taxpayer
to contest a tax deficiency before payment of the amount in
controversy.205
The Tax Court’s expertise makes it particularly well situated to
call attention to the weak points in technical arguments for deference
to tax guidance. Refund courts also play an important role, and this Article does not suggest that generalist judges cannot process technical tax
arguments. Refund courts would seem comparatively well situated to
draw lessons from non-tax law and offer factfinding by jury. Having two

200. Id. at 2073.
201. Id. at 2080.
202. Id. at 2083 & n.346 (citing Catherine Donnelly, Participation
and Expertise: Judicial Attitudes in Comparative Perspective, in Comparative A dministrative Law 370, 370–74 (Susan Rose-Ackerman et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2017); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: The
Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States 10 (1995)).
203. Emerson, supra note 199, at 2086.
204. See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015) (sustaining
arbitrary and capricious challenge to a tax regulation), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1016
(9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S.
478, 480 (2012) (finding “omission” unambiguous contrary to IRS argument
that an omission from income includes an overstatement of tax basis in an
asset).
205. Saltzman & Book, supra note 67, ¶ 1.03[4]; Hoffer & Walker,
supra note 5, at 224.
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routes to review with different institutional strengths adds to
accountability.206
On the other hand, interference by another expert may have a
cost in terms of expertise. That is, under the assumption that Congress
delegated administration to the IRS and Treasury Department, even
though judges of the Tax Court are experts, they have not been the object
of a delegation to fill in gaps. As Stephanie Hoffer and Chris Walker
have explained, the Tax Court has not been shy to substitute its judgment, even in non-deficiency matters seemingly committed to the discretion of the IRS.207 In any event, review by the Tax Court has proved
to be a potent check on the IRS;208 this cuts against generic objections
to agency overreach.
3. Self-Assessment and Voluntary Compliance
It is a truism that our tax system is based on voluntary compliance.209
This may, of course, be true to an extent with many administrative

206. See Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax
Court, 63 Duke L.J. 1835, 1880–81 (2014) (contrasting expertise of the Tax
Court, with the limits of expertise and the benefits of input from generalist
judges).
207. See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 5, at 250–51, 258–59, 261–62.
208. See generally David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as
an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. Ill. L. R ev. 17 (1995); James Edward
Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study
of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 Tenn. L. R ev. 351, 399, 425 (1999) (concluding that the Tax Court “is not biased in favor of the IRS” and that “it
might be biased in favor of taxpayers” but reserving on the latter question); cf.
Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 Fla.
St. U. L. R ev. 205, 254 (2013) (“The better studies refute rather than confirm
the Tax Court’s alleged pro-IRS bias.”).
209. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453 (2003); J.T. Manhire,
Tax Compliance as a Wicked System, 18 Fla. Tax R ev. 235 (2016) [hereinafter, Manhire, Wicked System]; J.T. Manhire, There Is No Spoon: Reconsidering the Tax Compliance Puzzle, 17 Fla. Tax R ev. 623 (2015); J.T. Manhire,
What Does Voluntary Tax Compliance Mean?: A Government Perspective,
164 U. Pa. L. R ev. Online 11 (2015); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance:
“This Return Might Be Correct But Probably Isn’t,” 29 Va. Tax R ev. 645
(2010).
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regimes.210 Tax may be unique in terms of the breadth of recurring
application to millions of taxpayers, complexity, and continued budgetary constraints of the IRS. Adopting a regime that signals a weakened ability of the government to audit—
especially when elite
taxpayers achieve salient victories—
may have particularly strong
negative consequences for the tax system.
Various models explain why taxpayers comply, given an audit
rate that is so low in the United States. Deterrence clearly explains some
compliance. But scholars have been surprised at the extent that deterrence fails to account for the high degree of compliance.211 Behaviorism and signaling may account for the difference.212
Behavioral theories suggest that bounded rationality limits a
taxpayer’s ability to make utility-maximizing decisions. Behaviorists
also posit that social norms, such as perceptions of fairness, patriotism,
and reciprocity may drive compliance.213 Signaling theory “focuses on
the taxpayers’ perception of the government as a ‘strong’ auditor; the
tax authority has a reputation both for accurately selecting tax returns
for audit that contain noncompliance, and the audits themselves are very
effective at discovering noncompliance on an audited tax return.”214
Accordingly, it is important that the tax system be perceived as
fair and that the IRS be perceived as effective. Fairness cuts both ways
in the context of administrative procedure, though effectiveness only
cuts against vacating tax rules on technicalities. All other things being
equal, the ability of the public to participate in a rulemaking would seem
likely to promote perceptions of fairness.215 On the other hand, the APA
rules for participation do not seem critical to promoting the appearance

210. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA,
49 Admin L. R ev. 713 (1997).
211. See Manhire, Wicked System, supra note 209, at 248–50.
212. Id. at 251–52.
213. Id. at 250–52.
214. Id. at 252.
215. See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology
of Procedural Justice 242 (1988) (observing that individuals “pay a great
deal of attention to the way things are done and the nuances of their treatment
by others”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass
Aggregation, 44 Wake Forest L. R ev. 1, 5–6 (2009) (noting the significance
of fair procedure for compliance).
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of fairness.216 Moreover, the business interests that dominate tax
rulemakings do not care about process values so much as outcomes.217
The I.R.C.’s system of accuracy-related penalties promotes
reporting uncertain positions, which also ties into deterrence. These penalties have been a part of the I.R.C. since 1918 and 1921.218 The Treasury later expanded upon these provisions in regulations:
[I]n 1991, Treasury adopted Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662–3
and 1.6694–3, in which it expressly defined rules and
regulations for purposes of these penalty provisions as
including temporary regulations, revenue rulings, and
IRS notices, while suggesting in the regulatory preamble that the same would be true of at least some revenue procedures. After comments to the proposed
definition objected particularly to the inclusion of
revenue rulings on the ground that those documents
lacked public notice and comment, Treasury contended that the 1976 legislative history “expressly
provides that rules and regulations include regulations and ‘IRS rulings.”’219
These penalties are important to reduce the incentive to play the
“audit lottery.” Importantly, a taxpayer is not absolutely prohibited from
taking a position contrary to published tax rules or regulations. Depending on the type of authority, the taxpayer’s position may need to meet
the substantial authority standard or have a reasonable basis and be disclosed on the tax return.220 A position dependent on the invalidity of a
216. See Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 22, at 384 (asserting
that “the public neither knows nor cares if the IRS cuts the APA’s procedural
corners”) (citing Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance (2013)).
217. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected
Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787, 817–18
& nn.148–149 (2001) (citing studies that suggest a distinction between individual and institutional litigants).
218. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 526.
219. Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted; quoting T.D. 8381, 1992–
1
C.B. 374).
220. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662–3; 1.6694–3 (c); see also Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr. & Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, and Protecting
Taxpayers, 68 Tax Law. 83, 112–16 (2014).
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regulation must represent a good faith challenge and identify the
regulation.221
The critical importance of voluntary compliance and self-
assessment for the function of the tax system counsels caution in
embracing demanding procedural regimes that could undermine the
IRS’s ability to audit. The existence of reliable tax rules taps into important signaling mechanisms as well as deterrence. If tax rules are hanging on by a thread, with dated 222 APA claims lurking around every
corner, taxpayers may feel more and more willing to disregard them and
fail to disclose inconsistent positions.223
4. Public Participation in Tax Rulemaking
To the extent that the purposes of public participation matter, the interest group model “demands robust and diverse participation in the process, which appears to be lacking in tax rulemaking.”224
First, elite taxpayer interests already dominate the comment
process. Professors Oei and Osofsky recently documented the pre-
comment period influence of well-organized stakeholders toward the
section 199A regulations.225 As Professor Stephanie McMahon has
noted, notwithstanding the existence of a statutory process for commenting, “many scholars argue that the majority of comments received
on tax regulations are informal and delivered over the phone.”226 Professor Wallace conducted a sample of rulemaking activity by the IRS
and Treasury Department post-
Mayo and concluded that “there
often has been very close to zero participation,” and “the few participants have been heavily weighted towards private interests, often

221. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694–3 (c)(2).
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. Cf. Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 Yale J.
on R eg. 491, 543 (2017) (concluding, in part, that “greater certainty mostly
leads to greater compliance” and the “market for legal advice tends to increase
the perceived certainty of the law and make uncertain standards appear more
permissive”).
224. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 217.
225. See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 163.
226. See McMahon, supra note 5, at 562–63.
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sophisticated business taxpayers seeking to reduce tax liability in ways
that were wholly predictable when Congress addressed the issue.”227
Further, McMahon argues that despite the irregularities in comparison with the APA, there is no substantive problem with the process
actually provided: “Historically, there has been little complaint from
practitioners about any of the forms of tax guidance, particularly on procedural grounds. ‘Most members of the tax community believe that
Treasury does a decent job in drafting regulations and instead focus their
grumbling on issues where guidance is lacking.’”228 Wallace observes
that an “important feature of the archetype notice-and-comment process is . . . missing from responses to many proposed tax regulations:
These rules often do not seem to prompt useful data or insights to inform
the rulemaking process.”229
It may be puzzling why the Treasury Department so often entertains comments, even before the proposed rulemaking and even when
it claims an exemption from the APA. Perhaps the agency is following
its own self-interest. To the extent that a rulemaking is interpretative,
the statutory arguments made in the comments may be helpful in assessing the government’s likelihood of achieving deference to the regulations. To the extent that sophisticated taxpayers have sophisticated
textual arguments related to a proposed rule, the government’s interest
aligns with the taxpayer’s interest in considering those arguments.230
On the other hand, if the Treasury Department is acting under
a delegation that is closer to a meaningless standard, it may, to some
extent, perceive public comments to be a nuisance. Whatever the Treasury’s attitude, such comments, assuming a level of materiality, must
be given adequate consideration. And, if the Treasury had already
decided on the content of the rule, then there could potentially be little

227. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 217.
228. See McMahon, supra note 5, at 568 (quoting Hickman, supra
note 54, at 1800).
229. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 224.
230. Cf. Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 Admin. L. R ev. 263, 328 (2018) (“the suggestion that public input on
such questions would not be helpful to an administrative agency seems startling”). But cf. id. (“The best justification for the exemption would be that the
agency does not need to offer the public an opportunity to be heard when an
interpretive rule is issued because that opportunity will be made available
later in the administrative process.”).
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perceived benefit to comments. That is because, if the agency can adequately address a policy objection, the ultimate decision belongs to the
agency if permissible under the organic statute. This is not to suggest
that Treasury does not value public comment, but some comments are
inevitably more constructive than others. The agency ultimately does
not have to remain neutral and is accountable.231
Thus, to the extent that even imbalanced public participation
legitimates, restraining the tax administration would seem to be more
important when it is applying specific authority delegations that are
closer to the prototypical meaningless standard. Even though interpretative rules are excepted from the APA’s notice and comment requirement, it is probably in the Treasury’s own interest to get feedback on
such rules sooner than litigation. This may not always be practicable.
Although the government should be more nuanced in its analysis and
not simply assume that general-authority regulations are interpretative,
some impactful rules should be able to qualify as interpretative under
the APA. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity surrounding the contours of
“interpretative rules” destabilizes tax rules; this is particularly acute if
the statute of limitations on APA-based challenges has no teeth in litigation surrounding tax rules.232
IV. Clarifying the Tax Administration’s Friction
with the APA
To think about prejudicial and harmless error, it is necessary first to clarify what counts as an error at all. Much attention has been devoted to
the potential for chilling public participation when the Treasury promulgates temporary regulations. This Article posits that there are more
important challenges on the horizon for Treasury and the IRS.
First, Treasury and the IRS should anticipate substantiating their
reasoned decisionmaking in court. Notwithstanding a major victory in
Altera, this will be a growing problem for the tax administration even

231. Cf. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. R ev. 1537, 1539 (2006)
(“Treasury officials are more democratically accountable, are better positioned to respond through regulations to changes in taxpayer behavior and tax
policy trends, and possess significantly more expertise over the complexities
of the tax laws than most judges.”).
232. See supra Part II.B–C.
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more so than for other agencies. Unless the government pursues and
obtains repose under the statute of limitations, notwithstanding potential unfairness on account of the Anti-Injunction Act, there will be instability if the courts invariably vacate procedurally defective rules.
This Article also posits that the potential for retroactivity of tax
rules will be increasingly important to clarify. This is probably most
important if the tax legislative process follows a speedy path that ends
up implying broad delegations to the Treasury. The problem is even more
acute if the application of the “interpretative rules” exception under the
APA suffers from a crabbed tax jurisprudence.
In short, this Part urges courts and commentators to accept that
tax rules (including regulations) can—
under the prevailing
jurisprudence—qualify as interpretative. Second, although it is a closer
call, this Part explains the need for judicial resolution of whether tax
rules and regulations that cannot qualify as “interpretative rules” can be
backdated.233 Finally, this Part offers preliminary thoughts on how harmless error analysis may (or may not) be extended to some of the principal
process defects that are likely to be implicated in tax rulemaking.
A. Tax Rules (Including Regulations) May Qualify as
“Interpretative Rules”
Important consequences turn on the APA distinction between substantive or legislative rules, on the one hand, and “interpretative” rules, on
the other.234 Courts have struggled to apply these principles to concrete

233. See infra Part IV.B.
234. See supra Part II.D; see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy,
758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As then-Judge Kavanaugh explained:
So given all of that, we need to know how to classify an
agency action as a legislative rule, interpretive rule, or general statement of policy. That inquiry turns out to be quite
difficult and confused. It should not be that way. Rather,
given all of the consequences that flow, all relevant parties
should instantly be able to tell whether an agency action is a
legislative rule, an interpretive rule, or a general statement
of policy—and thus immediately know the procedural and
substantive requirements and consequences. An important
continuing project for the Executive Branch, the courts, the
administrative law bar, and the legal academy—and perhaps
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scenarios. Even focusing on the law of a particular circuit, the jurisprudence can be muddled.235
1. Defining “Interpretative” Rules
As with many APA concepts, the interpretative distinction is not easy
to apply.236 Courts typically ask whether the agency’s rule is in the nature
of a clarification of the statute.237 Or, does the agency have no basis to
enforce the organic statute without the rule? If, in the language of the
often-cited Attorney General’s Manual, the agency’s action goes further
than to “advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes
and rules which it administers,”238 then the nature of the rule must be
substantive rather than interpretative.
Clarifications are not necessarily toothless or unimportant.
Interpretative is not synonymous with merely stating the obvious: “[A]
true ‘no-brainer’ interpretation would be exempt from rulemaking
requirements anyway. The APA has a separate exemption for situations
in which public procedures would be ‘unnecessary,’ meaning that members of the public would have no interest in commenting on the rule in
question.”239 An agency may draw from case law and its experience

for Congress—will be to get the law into such a place of
clarity and predictability.
Id.
235. See generally Morgan Douglas Mitchell, Note, Wolf or Sheep?
Is an Agency Pronouncement a Legislative Rule, Interpretive Rule, or Policy
Statement?, 62 Ala. L. R ev. 839 (2011) (survey of the tests employed across
the Circuit Courts of Appeals).
236. See Kovacs, supra note 16, at 532 (noting that the APA was a
compromise made possible through intentional ambiguity); Levin, supra note
230, at 316–17 (“Asimow elsewhere called the distinction ‘exceptionally elusive’ and ‘maddeningly indeterminate.’ To Elizabeth Magill, it is ‘a notoriously difficult enterprise.’ According to Jacob Gersen, ‘To describe the
legislative rule debate is to conjure doctrinal phantoms, circular analytics,
and fundamental disagreement even about correct vocabulary.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
237. See Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996).
238. Attorney General’s Manual, supra note 53, at 30 n.3.
239. See Levin, supra note 230, at 329 (footnotes omitted).
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about the facts to issue an interpretative rule.240 Moreover, under this
approach, interpretative rules may draw quantitative lines that are not
apparent from the text of a statute.241 But if an agency rule is necessary
for an agency to maintain an action against a regulated party, then it
could not properly be classified as interpretative.242
Professor Levin has been a vocal critic of this “most common”
approach to the issue.243 Although it “follow[s] logically from the . . . 
[statutory] language,” Levin argues that the test is “incoherent” and
“pointless”244; that “the courts took a wrong turn decades ago when they
embraced that approach, and that the result has been bafflement ever
since.”245
Levin encapsulates the case against following the plain language
of the APA interpretative rules exception as follows:
[T]he interpretive rules exemption matters only in relation to debatable issues of interpretation. As to those
issues, any notion that the agency’s chosen interpretation must be already implicit in (discernible from) the
underlying statute or regulation is an exercise in
question-begging. Indeed, the agency will likely have
issued the interpretive rule because affected persons
have previously disagreed about its subject matter.246

240.

See Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir.

2005).
241. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 111 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (approving of “detailed examples, including step-
by-step calculations, of how certain rules should be applied to particular
facts” but disagreeing that reversal of a prior rule could qualify as interpretative); Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171.
242. See Levin, supra note 230, at 323–24; see also Wurman,
supra note 44, at 731 (positing that “insofar as the rule is not merely an interpretation, but actually a specification” public participation “is and ought to be
required by the APA”).
243. Ronald M. Levin, Unifying the APA Exemptions for Policy
Statements and Interpretive Rules, Admin & Reg. L. News, Winter 2018, at 4, 5.
244. Id.
245. See Levin, supra note 230, at 317.
246. Id. at 329.
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Levin’s assertion seeks to rebut a potential counterargument that the cost
of agencies undertaking notice and comment rulemaking outweighs
the benefits of public participation, at least for interpretative rules.
True enough, if an issue is debatable, there is probably some benefit to
participation. But that does not compel the conclusion that it is always
worth the cost.247
Different administrators may either have different views of
whether interpretative rules may bind or may not have focused much
on the particular issue. Professor Nicholas Parrillo’s study focuses on
guidance, how it may practically bind, and what to do about it; for purposes of the study, “guidance” was defined to exclude guidance that an
interviewee thought was legally binding.248 Although not the central
question, Professor Parrillo’s interviews with agency officials and former officials uncovered a divergence of views, or lack of confidence in
some cases, about whether interpretative rules may legally bind.249
As an example aligning with the most common judicial approach
to the question whether interpretative rules may legally bind, “a large
law firm partner, not a specialist on a particular agency, said the courts
and the bar generally did understand that interpretive rules could bind,
and that was how most regulated entities approached the issue.”250 In
contrast, Marc Freedman, the executive director of labor law policy for
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “said the Chamber assumed that, when
DOL issued guidance, it intended to make that guidance ‘stick’—the
Department would not commit resources to issuing a document to which
it would not adhere—but when asked about the theory that interpretive
status conferred power to bind, he said that ‘seems academic.’”251 One
comment, on the other hand, is telling about the (lack of) salience of
this issue, as “a former senior EPA official with cross-office responsibilities, recalled the agency proceeding by interpretative rule for the

247. For a discussion of imbalanced participation in tax rulemaking, see supra Part II.A and D.
248. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the
Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 Yale. J. on
R eg. 165, 168 n.6 (2019).
249. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, R eport for the Administrative
Conference of the United States, Federal Agency Guidance: An Institutional Perspective 22–26 (Oct. 12, 2017).
250. Id. at 25 n.36.
251. Id. at 24 n.36.
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specific reason that such a vehicle would be binding, though she said
she only saw this happen ‘once’ during her tenure.”252
The IRS and Treasury Department have consistently asserted
that, in general, tax rules and regulations are interpretative, but without
providing specific reasons.253 This test is not terrible as a heuristic. Broad
delegations enacted by Congress to allow the Treasury Department to
craft tax rules are less common.254 Although there is something to be
said for the general-versus-specific distinction, it fails fully to grapple
with the fuzzy legal tests in this area.255 An agency need not have virtually unfettered discretion for its action to cross the line between interpretative and substantive rulemaking.
Professor Hickman, on the other hand, has argued that practically all tax rules are legislative:
If the goal is to determine which agency actions carry
the force of law, then distinguishing between temporary
Treasury regulations and IRB guidance based on the
relative severity or leniency of Treasury’s penalty standards, as the Kornman court did, draws the line in the
wrong place. Under either standard, the government
seeks to impose penalties for noncompliance on at least
some taxpayers who fail to comply with interpretations
advanced in the listed formats. If one associates congressionally imposed penalty provisions (and agency
interpretations thereof) with the delegation of authority to act with the force of law, then the relevant line
ought instead to be between formats that carry penalties and those that do not.256
Hickman’s gloss derives from a historical convention suggesting that
penalties for violation of a rule indicate that it carries the force of law.257
252. Id. at 23–24 n.36.
253. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 467–68; Hickman, supra note
54, at 1757.
254. See generally Wallace, supra note 5 (arguing that Congress
takes more control of tax policy than other administrative areas to take credit
for the policies).
255. Cf. Levin, supra note 230, at 337–40.
256. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 529.
257. Id. at 526.
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In respect of a deficiency in tax, the accuracy-related penalty would
generally apply if a taxpayer’s tax deficiency is attributable to the disregard of rules or regulations.258 In turn, Hickman argues that any tax
rules that count as authority have been promulgated in the exercise of
Treasury’s authority to act with the force of law.259 The Tax Court
applied something resembling Hickman’s proposal in Altera,260 before
applying the standard test more recently in Oakbrook Land Holdings.261
Professor Hickman’s rule would be attractively easy to apply
and somewhat resembles Professor Levin’s suggestion to focus on binding norms and whether an agency has afforded a fair and adequate
opportunity to participate later.262 But this makes too much of the incentive to disclose tax return positions that are contrary to tax rules. Interpretative rules can create incentives for regulated parties to study the
rules and consider costly action to comply or work around the rules.263
Moreover, the I.R.C. acknowledges that there will be tiers of guidance,
rather than all rules collapsing into one “binding” category. The IRS
cannot and does not argue for a strict liability penalty for violating tax
rules. The I.R.C. and Treasury regulations provide play in the joints for
taxpayers to take uncertain tax positions,264 which will sometimes be
contrary to administrative guidance.
Courts also should not adopt a bright-line test for what tax rules
count as interpretative. The IRS and Treasury Department cannot

258.

Id. at 526–27; see also supra text accompanying notes 218

to 219.
259. Id. at 529.
260. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 116–17 (2015), rev’d,
926 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019).
261. Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180, 189
(2020) (“An interpretative rule merely clarifies or explains preexisting substantive law or regulations.”).
262. See Levin, supra note 230, at 356–57.
263. See id. at 344 (“Yet the function of an interpretive rule—its
only reason for existing—is to specify which of various imaginable meanings
of the underlying statute or regulation the agency considers correct. Thus, to
say that, because the statute is binding, the interpretation that the agency happens to have selected must also be binding begs the question.”).
264. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 467–69.
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simply declare any rule “interpretative,”265 nor would it be appropriate
to require all tax regulations to undergo notice and comment under
the APA. This would go against consistent administrative practice,
though the scope of the problem is blurred by the Treasury’s propensity
to go through notice and comment.266 Instead, the courts should apply
the flexible, judge-made standards to tax rulemaking that are being
applied to other administrative rulemaking.267 Tax cases post-Mayo

265.

In contrast, the Internal Revenue Manual states:

[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations will be interpretative regulations because they fill gaps in legislation or have a prior
existence in the law. . . . [and] the underlying Internal Revenue Code section imposing the tax or providing for collection of a tax will provide an adequate legislative basis for
the action in the regulations.
I.R.M. § 32.1.5.4.7.4.1(2). Clearly, however, some tax rules will indeed be legislative. It is insufficient for the IRS and Treasury to reflexively invoke the
exception for interpretative rules.
266. See Camp, supra note 5, at 1680. As Professor Camp summarizes:
This is the new orthodoxy: it is wrong to treat tax administration differently from the work of other administrative
agencies. There is no better evidence of orthodoxy than to
find the idea encapsulated in a student note that dutifully
summarizes the story this way: “For years, generally applicable administrative law was not applied to taxation under
the doctrine of tax exceptionalism.”
Id. (quoting Recent Case, Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 126 Harv. L. R ev. 1747, 1747 (2013)).
267. See, e.g., Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 401 F.3d
666, 679 (6th Cir. 2005); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79–80 (1st Cir. 1998);
Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 171–72 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. Am. Mining Cong. v.
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasizing “whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate
legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties”). But see Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick,
813 F.2d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 1987) (focusing on whether there is binding
effect on the agency).
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clearly are applying the general administrative law test, although not
always.268 Sometimes the government will lose on its theory that a rule
qualifies as “interpretative.”269 But that is a far cry from applying a
bright line rule against interpretative tax regulations or other rules that
go beyond safe harbors.270
2. The I.R.C.’s Retroactivity Provisions Corroborate the
Concept of Interpretative Tax Rules (Including Regulations)
As discussed above, the “interpretative rules” exception under the APA
should encompass a variety of tax rules (including regulations). Following that general approach would relieve some of the apparent friction
between the tax administration and the APA. That approach is probably sufficient; however, this section observes that the I.R.C. corroborates
the notion that there will be interpretative tax rules and regulations.
Section 7805 allows the IRS and Treasury Department to specify the retroactive effect of rules.271 As Part II explained, until 1996, retroactive application to the date of the statutory provision was the
presumption for tax rules; moreover, there are a variety of allowances
for retroactive rules relating to more recently enacted statutory
provisions.272
Although interpretative rules may apply retroactively, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to infer agency power to apply other
rules with retroactive effect.273 But section 7805(b) should not be given

268. See Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019);
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180 (2020). But see
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 116–17 (2015), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2019).
269. Bullock, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 1158. Although the opinion is
unclear, the court seemed to characterize the revenue procedure as legislative,
because the Secretary was implementing an open-ended delegation to require
(or cease to require) “other information” to be included on an information
return. The court largely ignored the government’s argument that the revenue
procedure could qualify as a rule of “procedure or practice.” Id. at 1155.
270. Cf. Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (clarifying that publication in the C.F.R. is nothing more than
a “snippet of evidence of agency intent”).
271. See I.R.C. § 7805(b).
272. See text accompanying notes 112 to 117.
273. See text accompanying notes 107 to 111.
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an absurdly narrow reading. At a minimum, this suggests that tax rules
can be interpretative, though it will be a heavier lift to conclude that legislative tax rules may be applied retroactively.274
Moreover, if no tax rules could be interpretative, it would be
puzzling for Congress to refer to “rules” as distinct from “regulations.”
In the restrictive view, both would have to undergo a process involving
public participation, yet “rules” would not carry as much weight. It seems
more likely that the tiers of authority are available for the accuracy-
related penalty as well as for retroactivity purposes.275
Some tax scholars point to the possibility of a “good cause”
escape hatch from the APA.276 Professor McMahon argues that good
cause should be read more expansively,277 although Professor Hickman
stresses persuasively that the APA’s “good cause” exception rarely will
be plausible for tax rules.278 Even if good cause could plausibly excuse
274. See infra Part IV.B.
275. But cf. Hickman, supra note 54, at 1773 (identifying multiple
specific references to both “rules” (or “rulings”) and “regulations” in legislative history though concluding the argument is weak).
276. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 522 (“More generally, in the
APA itself, Congress provided the good cause exception whereby agencies
can adopt legislative rules without notice and comment given the right circumstances. If Congress has authorized alternative procedures for binding
regulated parties with the force of law, then it makes little sense to deny the
resulting rules legal force and thus Chevron deference because the agency did
not follow the APA’s notice and comment procedures.”); see also id. at 532
(suggesting that the good cause exception might apply in the case of tax shelter transactions).
277. McMahon, supra note 183, at 575–84.
278. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93–94 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced” in “emergency situations, where delay could result in serious harm” rather than an
“escape clause” (citations omitted)); Hickman, supra note 5, at 494 (“truly
unusual circumstances, such as when public safety is threatened or advance
notice of a rule might undermine its application”); James Kim, For a Good
Cause: Reforming the Good Cause Exception to Notice and Comment
Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 18 Geo. M ason L.
R ev. 1045, 1053 (2011) (“On the whole, judicial decisions recognize an agency’s reliance on the good cause exemption in three situations: (1) where there
is an immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare; (2) where prior
notice of a proposed rule causes harm and frustrates the purpose of the rule;
and (3) where Congress has explicitly or implicitly exempted a specific rule
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postpromulgation comment with respect to an occasional temporary regulation, this narrow exception from the APA would not align plausibly
with the general rules of section 7805(b).
On balance, Congress seems to have assumed it would be quite
possible for the Treasury to promulgate a retroactive tax rule. The following section examines whether I.R.C. section 7805 creates a more
expansive exception to the APA requirements that could apply beyond
interpretative rules.
B. Retroactivity of Tax Rules
Some tensions between the APA and the I.R.C. can be avoided by a standard application of generally applicable jurisprudence on interpretative
rules. But the availability of a robust interpretative rules exception from
the APA notice and comment process cannot resolve all the tensions.
For example, what if Congress continues to enact complicated tax acts,
with the expectation that the Treasury Department will move quickly
to issue appropriate regulations to implement the new statutory provisions? The government can only lean so hard on the interpretative rules
exception; eventually, it will be critical to know the reach of the I.R.C.
backdating provisions. For example, do regulations implementing a new
tax act or aimed at preventing abuse have to comply with the general
presumption against retroactivity, along with the delayed effective date
requirement of APA section 553(d)? Moreover, if courts were to take
up whether the Treasury’s power to backdate is limited to interpretative
rules, this relates to a substantive question of permissibility. This question does not seem susceptible to an approach of remedial restraint; the
rule of prejudicial error cannot convert an impermissible statutory interpretation into one that is permissible.
Arguably, the I.R.C. provisions on retroactivity do not conflict
with APA section 553(d) and are clear enough to rebut the general
presumption against retroactivity. This reading seems especially

necessary with respect to new tax acts and the prevention of abuse. A

from informal rulemaking procedure.”). But see McMahon, supra note 183,
at 575–84 (citing the cumulative effect of delay and dysfunction to argue that
“the good cause exception from notice and comment should be available
under its prongs of ‘impracticability’ and ‘contrary to the public interest’ any
time Congress incorporates revenue estimates for tax legislation into the
budget”).
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challenge for a sweeping construction of I.R.C. section 7805(b) is a
canon of construction prescribed by the APA: “No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act
except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.”279
Accordingly, although courts and commentators have long thought that
retroactivity is not limited to interpretative tax rules, one might insist
section 7805(b) should apply only if a tax rule qualifies as an interpretative rule.280
Very limited applications of the I.R.C. backdating provisions are
easily reconcilable with the APA. This is true of interpretative rules
(subject to the ambiguities of the concept281) that are backdated to the
notice of proposed rulemaking. But the I.R.C. also calls for backdating
to prevent abuse282 and to implement new statutory provisions of the
I.R.C. within 18 months.283 These provisions seem likely to involve
broader gap filling than the interpretative rules exception can accommodate. Unfortunately, nothing in section 7805 expressly addresses the
requirements of the APA.
Despite the APA’s rule of construction, courts have left the door
open to repeal by implication. As Justice Scalia explained in Lockhart:
Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legislature cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its
will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate—
including the repeal of pre-
existing provisions by

279. Administrative Procedure Act § 12, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946).
280. Compare Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d
972, 984–85 (5th Cir. 1977) (“settled law” that legislative rules may be retroactive); Bryan T. Camp, Note, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regulations:
Paths to Finding Abuse of Discretion, 7 Va. Tax R ev. 509, 512–13 (1988)
(noting split in case law on retroactivity, with some cases holding that only
legislative regulations were reviewable); Hickman, supra note 54, at 1738
(observing that “the potential for retroactive application is not necessarily
inconsistent with the general rule of a delayed effective date”), with David
Berke, Reworking the Revolution: Treasury Rulemaking and Administrative
Law, 7 Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. 353, 400–401, 412 (2018) (concluding that
“tax regulations can be interpretive” and arguing that the “plain language of
§ 7805(b) does not independently authorize retroactive regulations”).
281. See supra Part IV.A.
282. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
283. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2).
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simply and clearly contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), we interpreted the
Immigration and Nationality Act as impliedly exempting deportation hearings from the procedures of the
[APA], despite the requirement in § 12 of the APA that
“[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the
extent that such legislation shall do so expressly,” 60
Stat. 244. The Court refused “to require the Congress
to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an
exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.”
349 U.S., at 310. We have made clear in other cases as
well, that an express-reference or express-statement
provision cannot nullify the unambiguous import of a
subsequent statute. In Great Northern R. Co. v. United
States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908), we said of an express-
statement requirement that “[a]s the section . . . in
question has only the force of a statute, its provisions
cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as
manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment.” . . . 
A subsequent
Congress, we have said, may exempt itself from such
requirements by “fair implication”—that is, without
an express statement.284
If, as Justice Scalia reasoned, fair implication is the applicable standard
rather than a “magical password” rule, then section 7805(b) may be
clear enough. The answer may also depend on the precise framing of
the conflict. Courts might be more flexible in analyzing whether Congress has authorized the retroactivity of tax rules, which would be contrary to a general presumption but would not directly conflict with the
text of the APA.
A few cases have suggested that I.R.C. section 7805(b) need not
be read narrowly to avoid a conflict with the APA. The central logic is
that the rules of I.R.C. section 7805(b) rebut the general presumption
against retroactivity and either supersede or do not conflict with the

284. See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations shortened).
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delayed effective date requirement of APA section 553(d).285As the Tax
Court has explained, backdating was long the norm for all tax rules; section 7805(b) was originally conceived of as a discretionary relief provision.286 The Tax Court also has reasoned that “the conflict is more
apparent than real” when backdating under the I.R.C. follows a notice
and comment process.287 That is because “[t]he legislative history of the
APA reveals that the purpose of the 30-day rule of 5 U.S.C. sec. 553(d)
was to afford affected persons a reasonable time to prepare for final
effectiveness of a rule.”288 This logic would seem to depend on the Treasury proceeding by notice of proposed rulemaking, with the notice signaling an intent to backdate, and that the final rule be a logical
outgrowth of the proposed rule.
A narrower reading would hinge on the interpretative rules distinction. Although the text of the APA does not address the retroactivity of interpretative rules, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis addressed the
various roles administrative rules can play in a seminal article.289 Davis’s
observations have withstood the test of time.290 Acknowledging that

285. Redhouse v. Comm’r, 728 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir 1984) (“The specific statute giving the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to apply statutes
retroactively (I.R.C. § 7805(b)) would in any conflict take precedence over the
general notice statute (5 U.S.C. § 553(d)).”); Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 30
n.15A (1983) (explaining that although the “APA is a general statute, applying
equally to all Federal agencies,” the “Code, and more specifically section 7805, reflects a specific Congressional action to address a particular issue
(the power of the Secretary to establish regulations necessary to accomplish
the raising and collecting of revenue)”).
286. Wendland v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 355, 381 (1982) (observing that
“section 7805(b) was intended to be a taxpayer-relief provision by granting
the Internal Revenue Service power to avoid inequitable results” and that
“retroactive effect was presumed, and prospective application could only be
achieved by specific provision”).
287. Id. at 382.
288. Id. at 381; see also Hickman, supra note 54, at 1738 (“[T]he
potential for retroactive application is not necessarily inconsistent with the
general rule of a delayed effective date.”). But see Berke, supra note 280, at
412–14 (arguing that this logic elevates form over substance).
289. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative,
Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 Yale L.J. 919 (1948).
290. See e.g., Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 703 F.3d 388 (2012)
(holding that a new rule may be applied retroactively because the rule was
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interpretative and legislative rules are often difficult to distinguish,291
Davis noted that one distinguishing feature is how retroactivity applies
to either type of rule.292 While agencies could give retroactive effect to
legislative rules,293 interpretative rules naturally have more retroactive
application.294
Davis combined the logic of declaratory theory and the definition of interpretative rules to define why such rules may be applied
retroactively:
If an interpretative rule is merely an interpretation of a
statute, and if the meaning of the statute has been there
from the time of its original enactment, then no problem of a retroactive interpretative rule can arise, for
either the interpretative rule expresses the true meaning of the statute or it does not; if it does, then that is
“merely” clarifying what the agency always considered EMTALA, the statute
upon which the rule was based, to mean. The court further stated, perhaps to
not appear to be fully relying upon the declaratory theory, that if the new rule
was “patently inconsistent” with an older rule concerning the same statute,
then the new rule could not be applied retroactively.); see also William V.
Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, Duke L.J. 106, 144
n.209 (1991).
291. The distinguishing factors for legislative and interpretative
rules considered for this section are that legislative rules add to the existing
statute while interpretative merely clarify the statute upon which they are
based. See McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986) (“An
interpretive rule, as distinguished from a substantive or legislative rule, clarifies or explains existing law or regulations.”). But see Health Ins. Ass’n of
Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Where we part company
with the government is in its notion that interpretive rules merely echo things
‘that are already express in the statute’. . . . A rule may be interpretive even
though it ‘interprets’ a vague statutory duty or right into a sharply delineated
duty or right.” (citations omitted)).
292. Davis, supra note 289, at 944.
293. See id. at 945–48. Davis even advocated that retroactive legislative rules may have a necessary role. See K enneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies: Supplementing A dministrative Law Treatise
§ 5.08 (Supp. 1976). But see Bowen v. Georgetown Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988) (holding legislative rules may not be applied retroactively unless “that
power is conveyed by Congress in express terms”).
294. See Davis, supra note 289, at 949–50.

2020]

Reasonable Tax Rules339

what the statute has always meant and the rule has not
changed the law retroactively; if it does not, then it does
not matter whether the rule can be made retroactive, for
the rule is invalid in that it is inconsistent with the
statute.295
Multiple cases have used such logic over the years to justify retroactively applying interpretative rules.296
The current section 7805(b) limitations on backdating were
enacted in 1996.297 Prior versions assumed that administrative authorities would be applied retroactively, pending discretionary relief. Dean
Griswold, writing in 1941, reached only a “should”-level conclusion,
ostensibly on policy grounds, that retroactivity would be inappropriate
for legislative tax rules.298 In 1983, John S. Nolan and Victor Thuronyi
observed that administrative practice “usually” resulted in legislative

295. K enneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.09
(1958).
296. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 135
(1936) (“The regulation constitutes only a step in the administrative process.
It does not, and could not, alter the statute. It is no more retroactive in its operation than is a judicial determination construing and applying a statute to a
case in hand.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976)
(“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with
the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it
is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute.’ (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74
(1965), in turn quoting Manhattan, 297 U.S. at 134 (1936))); Utah Hotel Co. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 151 P.2d 467, 471 (1944) (reasoning that “new rulings are not
retroactive” but “are in fact but the first correct application of the law”); see
also Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 749, 754 (2007) (“Under the prevailing jurisprudence in this area, interpretative nonlegislative rules do not create new policy but merely clarify and
restate what the law ‘is and always has been.’” (quoting Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d
651, 654 (6th Cir. 1998)).
297. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
298. See Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L. R ev. 398, 411 (1941) (“[A]s a matter of wise tax administration, the Treasury should be held to have no power to amend a legislative
regulation retroactively.”).
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regulations taking prospective-only effect.299 Section 7805(a), at least
by the general administrative law understanding, almost certainly permits both interpretative rules and legislative rules.300 That view does not
align with the traditional heuristic for the classification of tax rules
according to general authority versus specific authority.301 It seems fairer
to say that the traditional tax approach has involved a blurring of
concepts.302
Even if the history uncovers confusion about the general administrative law content of “interpretative” rules, this need not be dispositive
of the scope of section 7805(b). It is possible for courts to update the law
with respect to deference doctrines and notice and comment requirements without limiting backdating or the general authority for rulemaking under I.R.C. section 7805. But the interpretative-rules-only reading
of section 7805(b) would represent an abrupt limitation on the power of
the Treasury. That reading would elevate hindsight over contemporary
practice and the reluctance of courts to disturb retroactive tax rules.303
Given the history, Congress must have been aware that the Treasury’s
rules—even legislative rules—could be retroactive. Moreover, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s APA-based concurrence, the opinion of the Court
in Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital rooted the presumption against retroactivity in general principles relating to administrative law.304 So, it should
also not be dispositive that Congress made no reference to the APA when
it acknowledged the Treasury’s retroactive rulemaking authority.
On balance, it is not clear that courts will, or should, substantially curtail the retroactivity of tax rules. Although reasonable minds
may differ, section 7805(b) should not be limited to interpretative rules.
299. See John S. Nolan & Victor Thuronyi, Retroactive Application of Changes in IRS or Treasury Department Position, 61 Taxes 777, 783
(1983) (noting that “Treasury usually follows the practice” (emphasis added)).
300. See Camp, supra note 5, at 1714 (citing student edition of
Davis, supra note 295).
301. See id. (noting that if this is “in some sense, a pretextual fiction, it is one that has persisted”).
302. Bittker & Lokken, supra note 40, ¶ 110.5.
303. See Camp, supra note 5, at 1709–1713 (describing the rhetorical or political tension against admitting that tax regulations could be legislative); Camp, supra note 280, at 513 (observing that even when courts reviewed
for abuse of discretion, “the taxpayer still has a long, hard journey to make
before a court will find against the Service under this standard”).
304. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
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At a minimum, section 7805(b) clearly evidences an intent that the Treasury will act to prevent abuse and foster equitable application of new
tax acts. Both these purposes could be especially frustrated by a strict
construction of section 7805(b), the text of which does not address interpretative rules. Commentators had assumed that Treasury’s retroactivity was a good thing because it helped achieve equal treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers.305 Limiting section 7805(b) to interpretative rules arguably asks too much of a general presumption against retroactivity and is not necessary to avoid conflict with the text of the APA.
C. Principal Challenges
This Part has thus far attempted to minimize some potential frictions
between the I.R.C. and the APA. Building on the clarifications, this section now offers a general outline of how harmless error analysis should
(or should not) be extended to some of the principal process defects that
are likely to be implicated in tax rulemaking.
Questions about fair notice and opportunity to participate meaningfully in rulemaking projects are generally questions of degree. And
these values should be balanced against other values. There is, in short,
no clear path to overall improvement in subjecting the tax
administration to strict compliance with the APA. Public participation
probably brings some benefits and at least marginally legitimates agencies’ exercise of discretion.306 Participation, unfortunately, can be
very costly depending on the remedy for an APA-based claim. 307

305. See Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A
View from Within, 87 Taxes, Aug. 2009, at 21.
306. See, e.g., Hickman & Thomson, supra note 5, at 267; Lederman, supra note 5, at 684; see also Levin, supra note 230, at 274.
307. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 29. Professor Murphy suggests
that the courts should adopt an attitude of restraint in the face of highly questionable cost-benefit analysis:
[W]hereas closing the Chevron gap was very cheap, closing
the notice-
and-
comment gap could prove quite costly.
Moreover, the primary reason for this cost is that the courts,
through extremely creative construction of the APA, have
made notice-
and-
comment procedures very expensive.
Worsening matters, these same courts have never been able
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Moreover, prepromulgation notice and comment combined with “hard
look” review hardly guarantee diverse and robust participation.308
Nor will strict scrutiny necessarily bring the outcomes sought
by interest groups. The difference between deference regimes may be
more theoretical than real.309 Thus, unless interpretative tax rules cannot stand, taxpayers would still be likely to confront a tax administration that receives deference. Reliance-worthy safe harbors are also not
destined to emerge from a regime of judicial review that imposes more
and more costs to promulgate a rule.310 Perhaps a future administration
would adjust by enacting relatively sweeping, vague tax regulations,
carefully responding to comments.311 But, having paid up-front, Treasury could perhaps implement the regulations through subsequent interpretative rules (and courts may defer).312

to devise a clear test for determining which rules require
notice-and-comment and which do not.
Id.
308. See Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing Participation, 12 Fla. Tax R ev. 517, 566–70 (2012);
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 Wash. U. L. R ev. 793, 826–30 (2021).
309. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. R ev. 135,
186 (2010) (concluding that the “reality is, in fact, much simpler” and advising that “courts and scholars should focus more on the unarticulated bases for
reversal in administrative law and less on the standards of review”).
310. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Foreign Partners Don’t Pay
Tax—Do They?, 164 Tax Notes Fed. 695, 695 (July 29, 2019) (criticizing
potential for diminished “guidance” after Treasury’s “large roadblock in the
way of subregulatory guidance”).
311. See Levin, supra note 230, at 338 (“Once an agency has
engaged in some rulemaking to implement an intransitive statute, it can then
issue guidance to interpret the regulation.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 Colum. L. R ev. 612, 657 (1996) (observing that “if an agency issues an
imprecise or vague regulation, it does so secure in the knowledge that it can
insist upon an unobvious interpretation, so long as its choice is not ‘plainly
erroneous’” (quoting, with emphasis added by Manning, Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
312. See Cummings, supra note 310, at 705 (criticizing abuse of
entity regulation or creating “a vast discretionary authority in the commissioner without any specific grant of authority, instead relying on
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It is doubtful that the Treasury would leverage administrative
law in this manner.313 Even if one doubts the balanced incentives for good
behavior of agencies, the Supreme Court has been chipping away at deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own rules.314 Rather, insisting on a perfect rulemaking process may not lead to diverse, robust,
legitimating participation—a highly optimistic narrative at best—or
even largely elective safe harbors. Strained for resources, even if non-
binding guidance keeps flowing from the Treasury Department, it could
be of relatively low quality and unsuitable for taxpayer reliance. Recent
complaints about FAQs may be a harbinger of future patterns.315
1. Inadequate Explanation Challenges
All agency action, even the promulgation of interpretative rules, is subject to challenge as arbitrary and capricious. The problem of “post hoc
rationalizations” could prove staggering for the tax administration unless
the courts take a pragmatic approach to judicial review. It is conceivable that the government could deflect some of the challenges by raising the statute of limitations, but it is far from clear how this will operate
in tax. This Article assumes that the expansive interpretation of the Anti-
Injunction Act will not be reversed, notwithstanding a pending case at
the Supreme Court.316 If that is the case, arbitrary and capricious challenges will probably proliferate and relate to tax rules that were promulgated many years ago.

section 7805(a)”); Levin, supra note 230, at 336 (“Even if the agency’s exercise of the rulemaking authority looks decidedly perfunctory, the courts do
not normally use the rulemaking provisions of the APA to foreclose such
guidance.”).
313. See Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effects on Agency Rules, 119 Colum. L. R ev. 85, 114–
15, 164 (2019) (summarizing countervailing agency incentives and finding
“no empirical evidence that agencies respond to Auer’s rule-writing incentives in any systematic way”).
314. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019); Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012); see also Matthew A. Melone, Kisor v. Wilkie: Auer Deference Is Alive but Not So Well. Is Chevron
Next?, 12 Ne. U. L. R ev. 581 (2020).
315. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
316. CIC Servs., LLC. v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020); see also sources cited supra note 75.
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In this context, inadequate explanation findings under “hard
look” review should often be excused as harmless error. Although courts
must take into account the unique facts of each case, tax rulemaking
often involves “heuristic reasoning” and would not ordinarily necessitate
data sets.317 Even if not a model of clarity, the Treasury typically will be
openly balancing competing values of equity and administrability; striving for clarity to avoid unintended consequences; and identifying
statutory language in addition to its general authority to make rules.
Although it is generally agreed that many existing tax rules have not
been issued with painstaking attention to responding to comments,
detailed responses may not even be necessary under a standard application of the doctrine.318 As Shapiro and Murphy have argued, if there is
adequate disclosure of information in the rulemaking, post hoc rationalizations should not be prejudicial.319
Exacerbating what is already a tricky question of degree, the
six-year statute of limitations320 on APA-based claims may not be applicable to APA-based claims seeking to invalidate tax rules. If that is true,
it is even more important for courts to adopt some measure of restraint
in crafting remedies for APA violations in the issuance of tax rules. As
the Tax Court’s approach in Altera and Oakbrook Land Holdings demonstrates, the issue of which comments are important enough to merit a
detailed response will often not lend itself to clear answers.321 Nonetheless, even with a harmless error mindset, courts could still vacate a rule
in extreme cases involving an objectively unreasonable decision to
ignore a major comment.

317. See Berke, supra note 280, at 416; McMahon, supra note 5,
at 603.
318. See Berke, supra note 280, at 416 (opining that “these principles can generally be explained pithily”).
319. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 22, at 362 (arguing that
“challengers would continue to have the information they need to intelligently
participate in the rulemaking process as well as to provide an informed,
adversarial point of view to courts during judicial review”).
320. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
321. Compare Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 121–22 (2015)
(rejecting explanation given in response to a comment), with Oakbrook Land
Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180, 191–92 (2020) (accepting brief statement that “comments from 90 organizations and individuals who supplied
voluminous commentary on many aspects of the proposed regulations” were
considered in making revisions to the proposed regulations).
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A potential problem of timing lurks around remedial restraint
in tax. This may require legislation to address if courts are to have a
viable option to remand rather than simply excuse (or hold prejudicial)
a process defect. Suppose a taxpayer’s tax liability hinges on whether a
regulation is valid, and the problem is not the permissibility of the interpretation but rather the adequacy of the explanation for the rule. If the
Treasury made a reasonable mistake in failing to address a comment, a
court could remand for further consideration. If the case is in Tax Court,
a pre-payment forum, it may be no great hardship for the matter to be
remanded to the IRS. But if the taxpayer has paid her entire tax liability and gone to refund court, a remand may be prejudicial to the taxpayer. It is far from clear that any such prejudice would be fundamentally
unfair. If the taxpayer ultimately wins, the taxpayer may be entitled to
interest on the overpayment. And a court could impose a deadline for
an adequate explanation. An arbitrary deadline, however, could also
make for an even worse explanation—or effectively resurrect a strict
compliance approach. A potential solution is for a (partial) refund to be
awarded, subject to further proceedings on remand. This would create
an incentive for expeditious consideration without a hard-edged deadline that could lead to poor reasoning on the part of the agency.
Although a harmless error approach would not completely gut
inadequate explanation review, it would substantially curtail unfair surprises in the tax context. If the goal in this context is not to provide
three or more bites at the apple, but rather transparency and reasoned
decisionmaking—within reason—this can be achieved with a pragmatic
approach that acknowledges the tension between nimble, effective
administration and addressing any matter that any other decisionmaker
might deem a substantial objection.
2. Challenges Alleging Defective Notice and Comment
Postpromulgation comment for legislative rules may suddenly be much
easier to excuse than post hoc rationalizations. Although the scope of
Little Sisters could be narrower than meets the eye, the Supreme Court
may indeed be serious that courts should not penalize postpromulgation comment. As explained previously, it may be premature to rely on
a robust application of Little Sisters.322 Moreover, even if a temporary
rule counts as proper notice, presumably the rule could not be effective
322. See text accompanying notes 170 to 181.

346

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 24:1

(without an APA exception) unless and until properly finalized after
comment.
The timing of challenges to tax rules, combined with the fuzziness of the interpretative rules distinction, counsel in favor of a rule of
reason that does not place a particularly heavy burden on the government. As explained previously, because the doctrine is particularly muddled, it is unrealistic to see abuse whenever the government makes a
mistake. And it is not necessary to crack down on those mistakes to
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to participate.
Now that the Treasury Department is making greater efforts to
provide an opportunity for public comment on rulemaking projects, the
interpretative rules distinction should be most important for pre-2011
rules. Arguably, the six-year statute of limitations should bar APA challenges to regulations and other rules issued pre-Mayo. But if challenges
to older rules are not barred, a court could remedy the error by allowing
for postpromulgation comment and treating the invalid rule as a notice
of proposed rulemaking. Depending on how courts interpret I.R.C. section 7805(b), backdating the newly finalized rule may be permissible.
On balance, this Article urges courts to align judicial review
with the overarching value of reasoned decisionmaking. This would permit the Treasury Department to treat a procedurally defective rule as a
proposed rule, if a reasonable (even if flawed) theory supported the Treasury’s decision against taking comments before promulgation of a rule.
This would, consequently, allow for a backdated effective date under
section 7805(b). If no significant comments are received, overturning
the rule would be a windfall for the taxpayer. If there are serious, non-
interpretive policy questions surrounding the rule, the Treasury Department may not be able to overcome those comments. It is not incumbent
upon taxpayers to anticipate major changes to a substantive rule, and
the Treasury Department may ultimately be compelled to change the
rule to adapt to persuasive comments. Substantial changes, however—if
combined with backdating to the date of a stale notice of proposed
rulemaking—would raise serious questions about retroactivity independent of the APA.
This is one pathway to excusing defects, but Little Sisters may
have answered this question even more permissively. Only time will tell
whether the case turned on its particular facts or truly represents a permissive shift toward postpromulgation comment. Pending further clarification, the Treasury would be wise to thoroughly address any plausible
APA exceptions in the preamble to its rules.
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3. Retroactivity
As this Part has discussed, questions surrounding the retroactivity
of tax rules are likely on the horizon. The prohibition on retroactivity of
legislative rules stems from general administrative law jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding section 7805(b), the overlap may be a question that is
not delegated to the Treasury. The Article assumes that backdating of
legislative tax rules will either be permissible, or not, depending on
whether section 7805 can extend beyond interpretative rules. This does
not seem amenable to a harmless error approach. But if retroactivity is
permissible for legislative tax rules, the Treasury’s decision to select the
applicable tax periods may be subject to abuse of discretion review along
with the substance of the rule.323
Separate from the timing of comment, courts will sooner or
later have to adjudicate issues concerning the scope of the I.R.C. backdating provisions. These stand in contrast to the APA delayed effective
date requirement for legislative rules. As discussed previously, this Article argues that the I.R.C. is clear enough about backdating authority
and does not truly conflict with the APA. Accordingly, I.R.C. section 7805(b) and its predecessor should not be limited, e.g., to rules that
would qualify as interpretative. Thus, there would be no procedural error
at all if the Treasury Department conducts a notice and comment
rulemaking—and consistent with an I.R.C. provision, backdates a final
rule that is identical to the proposed rule. In contrast, the backdating of
a final, non-interpretative rule that differed materially from a proposed
rule would often raise independent concerns about retroactivity that lie
beyond the scope of this Article.
Concerns about fair notice and adequate time to comply with
new rules are important, though independent of the timing of comments
on a new rule. For example, postpromulgation comment may be entirely
consistent with promoting transparency and affording commenters an
opportunity to participate. Postpromulgation comment does not, however, do anything to enable taxpayers to comply with a new rule of which
they had no prior notice. This concern would be particularly true if the
government required, without both a delayed effective date and applicability date, new reporting or withholding with respect to a new set of

323. See, e.g., Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d
972 (5th Cir. 1977); Camp, supra note 280.
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transactions. For abusive transactions, however, these concerns may well
be outweighed by other concerns (e.g., deterrence).
Conclusion
This Article has clarified the contours of error in the tax administration’s process for making rules, such as regulations, revenue rulings, and
more informal guidance. Far from an exceptionalist approach, the Article builds on non-tax and tax scholarship to make a limited claim that
there is no particular cause for concern if courts utilize nuance and flexibility in this administrative context. The Article describes several
potential applications of harmless error principles. If applied, these
principles would afford the Treasury Department flexibility without
chilling participation by the public or ignoring concerns about fair notice.
If not stretched beyond recognition, this approach should promote thoughtful, reliance-worthy rulemaking, as well as equity among
similarly situated taxpayers. Flexibility and restraint are unlikely to chill
robust participation by tax advisors, a core goal of the APA in this
context.
Different measures would be necessary to guarantee that the
Treasury Department carefully considers the feedback of policy analysts, public interest groups, and the general public. There are tools that
could help balance participation;324 however, this may be challenging to
enforce. This is particularly true considering that standing to challenge
taxpayer-favorable rules is notoriously difficult to establish.

324. See Book, supra note 308, at 573–76 (suggesting how to
enhance the role of the Taxpayer Advocate Service); Sant’Ambrogio &
Staszewski, supra note 308, at 831–43 (offering a “blueprint” for encouraging
agencies to plan early, reach missing stakeholders, and engage effectively).

